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No 10, October 1990

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Soviet Union SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

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Labor Career From the Standpoint of the Life Cycle

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[Article by Aleksandr Nikolayevich Komozin, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior science associate at the Scientific Research Center of the Higher Komsomol School Under the Komsomol Central Committee. The author is a permanent contributor to our journal]

[Text] The numerous sacrifices made by the people in the course of collectivization and industrialization were justified by the humanistic supergoal of forming a "new man." Economic efficiency, social security and legal protection were sacrifices precisely to this abstract person. The current desire of scientists to bring the economy "back down to earth" and force it to serve specific persons is understandable.

One of the possible ways to get rid of abstract humanism is to look at the economy from the position of typical human fate. In other words, to analyze to what degree the current model of economic management meets the needs of people in the various stages of the life cycle. For this, it is essential to view the level of consumption and the labor return of people depending upon age; that is, the belonging to a specific generation. But this is not enough. It is important to know the subjective needs and motives of actions and correlate in the mechanism of realizing possibilities its objective and subjective components. It is a question of considering the age or "generational" factor in economic sociology.

Incidentally, such an assertion is not completely correct. It is not a matter of considering the age factor. To some degree this has been done before, for example, in granting pensions or providing additional benefits for the youth. However, more often this happened accidentally. Age was presented as some "disturbing" factor which could be considered or possibly could not be considered. Sociology from the standpoint of the life cycle has introduced serious corrections into the established views.

It is felt that viewing the economy through the prism of changing generations upsets the unshakability of class views in accord with which the interests of people have always and uniformly been related to the social position of a person, with what, where and with whom he works: as a worker or engineer, on a kolkhoz or in industry. But what happens with a person who is initially a worker and then an engineer? Or, conversely, in having an engineer diploma he goes to work on a machine. How should we classify a kolkhoz member who studies by correspondence to be an agronomist but who has been shifted to the category of urban dweller and has become a renter?

What interests are closer to him: those of the worker or the engineer? Whose interests does he express as a representative of a certain social group? And how does belonging to different age groups tell on social affiliation? At the age of 20 he was a worker, at 35 he was an engineer and at 50 a manager. Different ages, different social positions but the person is the same.

The absolutizing of the class approach is not in the fact that the interests of social groups were considered only and solely depending upon their abstractly understood place in the production relations. And it was not even in the fact that all other interest with the exception of class ones were ignored. The scientific dogmatism was rather that nonclass values were viewed as harmful and were suppressed for the sake of the one sole and "most advanced" class.

In sociology, the problem of a career has been determined primarily within the context of the education of a person, his general and vocational training, the choice of a profession and the adaptation of those newly hired for a job [1-3]. The object of the research was, as a rule, young persons up to 20-25 years of age. The older ages were not taken into account and then pensioners became the subject of analysis [4]. But the very trajectory of a person's movement along his path of life including family and job, as a chain of interrelated changes, unfortunately, was not the object of systematic examination. However, an attempt to posit such a problem precisely as a scientific one can clearly be traced.

Why could such a thing happen? The reason, in my view, is that the conceptual apparatus of labor sociology has been focused primarily on group and socioclass processes. An important role was also played by the circumstance that the terminology by which one endeavored to fix the specific features of the new approach had not yet been completely worked out. The proposed concepts had not become established in scientific usage and had not assumed a clear methodological status. For this reason, the theoretical context of labor sociology was open to new knowledge. In principle it was not closed precisely because the patterns which should be studied in this area were of a problematic and sometimes deductive-hypothetical nature. Naturally, the isolating of the problem situation was also difficult, that is, from what the research should commence in aiming at isolating a scientifically based knowledge. In this context even in the first stage of theoretical analysis, it is essential to isolate the concept which fixes the content of the initial problem situation, that is, determining the typical destiny of a human life. Such a concept, in my opinion, should be the concept of a labor career.

Why precisely can this term claim the status of a scientific concept which is central if one views the economy from the standpoint of human fate?

In the first place, the concept of a labor career characterizes the socialization of the individual in its basic, if it can be so put, fatal and socially important sphere, labor

activity. Secondly, the given concept emphasizes the role of the individual personal principle in social life. Even now scientists describe social life in such a manner that social progress is possible here only en masse, as a crowd, a formation, classes and groups. The words "privitization," "private life" and "career" up to now have been suspect among the zealots of the ideals of barracks communism. The notion of a labor career assumes the extending of the sphere of the things conforming to the law to individual fate, that is, to an object which in accord with the simplistically interpreted principles of theory would ordinarily be linked to the socioclass status of a person. Patterns relating to an individual, if they were allowed, were considered to be exclusively psychological or at best sociopsychological. The status of objective patterns in relation to such a specific object were rejected out of hand.

It should be said in this regard that the delimiting into the objective natural (economic) and subjective unnatural (psychological) knowledge made it possible imperceptibly to manipulate the conscience and conduct of people. We were all challenged to equal the most advanced laws of "developed socialism" which would bring the greatest goods to the people. On the contrary, the indelibly personal lay outside the sphere of objective laws and higher purpose. This was considered in the area of the individual psyche and viewed as something not typical, temporary or exceptional.

Thirdly, the concept of a labor career is a definite method of relating to value and to historical time. In it is found the existential sign of a human fate of my typical contemporary who had the misfortune to be born in the age of the administrative system. This sign is a chronic falling behind, a delay of man in solving his natural problems and in realizing his sense and fate in life. The creative potential is not realized, the goal of life is not achieved, conditions seal off the emergence of emotions and there is a profound feeling of belonging to the "lost generation." A generation which is measurable not demographically but rather existentially. To promptly receive a good education, to promptly achieve a high level of skill and the corresponding wage in order to support a family independently and properly; to give one's children an education, to feel oneself a professional satisfaction and a satisfaction from the fact that you in this life have all the same achieved a solid social position—these are the main value priorities which determine the stages of a path of life in any social system. One can consider them the basic postulates for a normal labor career. According to the data of our research (this will be taken up further), the delay in resolving social problems such as professional maturity, the level of wages and income, the resolving of the housing question and so forth averages 10-15 years. As a result, those landmarks in life which should be a subject of pride and self-affirmation frequently become the grounds for frustration and dissatisfaction.

The concept of a labor career, in fixing the existing delay or contradiction in professional and social advancement

makes it possible to define oneself more precisely with a choice of the research methodology. Up to the present moment two extreme approaches have come into being. In one instance, the problems of the socially unprotected age groups—youth and elderly—were viewed as natural or temporary difficulties which in a way is correct. The youth is less prepared for professional activities and the elderly have lost or are losing their skill habits and they have less energy for active social adaptation. These are a sort of two boundary groups: the youth mature and move to a different social quality while the elderly simply die. So, seemingly there is nothing that need be done with them.

In accord with the other approach, and it is becoming evermore popular, it is proposed that the differences in the social support for the young, the middle-aged and elderly be eliminated chiefly by redistributing income in favor of the "weak." This idea has its logic which is not to the liking primarily of the middle-aged persons who assume on their shoulders the burden of concern for the social disabled. The typical response to a law on the youth (the Law on the Principles of State Youth Policy) is as follows: why should these young persons receive benefits which I did not have at my time; they receive an apartment right away while I had to wait 20 years.

For me, the solution lies not in distributing things equally but rather in producing more. The concept of a labor career differentiates producers by the age feature, however it is not aimed at confrontation but rather at the natural change of generations and their mutual dependence. Although relative separateness, autonomy of socioeconomic interests are not only not excluded but, on the contrary, are considered even more completely and strictly. The overcoming of the chronic delay and which is hard to call a career is not so much in granting benefits to the "weak" as it is having the "weak" become stronger, in other words, in eliminating the man-made restrictions and overcoming the mechanisms of inhibition on the path of life of others.

And, finally, one last thing. The concept of a labor career characterizes the drawing together of two sciences, economics and sociology. This signals the appearance of a third science which links them, economic sociology. Precisely such a concept unites both trends which can be clearly traced recently, the sociologization of economics, that is, a desire for its "humanization" which in practice often comes down to imposing on the existing management mechanism subjective aspirations and desires of people, and the economization of sociology, the giving of greater soundness and reliability to it in conclusions and recommendations. Having correctly posited the question of the need to study the path of life, sociologists have limited themselves to studying the subjective intentions in choosing a vocation. As a result, the socioeconomic context of choosing a vocation and most importantly, further advancement along this path, that is, the labor career per se, were merely designated but were virtually not investigated.

The author is far from concluding that a sociological concept of a labor career can be created now. Such a theory cannot be elaborated all at once and once and for all. In the first stages there arises the so-called test theory which is a hypothetical model of the subject of research and which is confirmed by a certain aggregate of empirical data. It is important to correctly formulate not only the basic theoretical assumptions which subsequently will perform the role of the monocrystal which produces the new knowledge but also the empirical foundation for the concept of a labor career. In our case such a foundation would be data on vocational training and wages which are two variables which describe the structure of the initial concept.

Vocational Training

Modern production demands a rise in skills from the workers every 4 or 5 years. In the leading firms of Japan, $\frac{1}{4}$ of the weekly working time budget is allocated for study. In our nation the question of whether or not there should be ongoing worker education has been bandied about for at least 10 years or so, but up to now there has been virtually no practical results. And as a consequence, in our country, in contrast to all the developed nations and a majority of the developing ones, the demand for a low-skill labor force is growing and not declining. According to the data of Leningrad sociologists, the average worker reaches his skill peak at the age of 40-45 [5], that is, at the very moment when the ability to learn declines sharply. The store of our physical and intellectual forces begins to decline here. There is the next delay in the life and vocational fate of a person.

In order for a worker to be able to grow professionally without falling behind the demands of production, at the initial stage of his career he should be trained for the future, considering the new technologies about to be introduced. Unfortunately, this does not happen for a whole series of objective and subjective factors. In the first place, there is a serious lag in the physical plant of the institutions of learning. The share of progressive equipment in the shops of the PTU [vocational technical schools] does not exceed 1.5 percent and $\frac{1}{2}$ of the machine tools is 30 years of age [5]. Secondly, there has been a decline in the significance of vocational knowledge in the eyes of the young people. According to the research data at the Scientific Research Center of the Higher Komsomol School Under the Komsomol Central Committee and carried out in 1988-1989 with the author's participation, only from 20 to 30 percent of the schoolchildren and the PTU students pointed to the necessity of having a good general education preparation. The results of more than 20 years of research carried out under the leadership of V.N. Shubkin in the guidance of schoolchildren have shown that along with an obvious decline in the prestige of scientific professions (physicists, biologists and so forth), there has been a sharp rise in the prestige of the salesperson profession [2].

Indifference and consumer motives in choosing a profession, along with the lack of a sufficient physical plant for obtaining a high-quality education end up as a

profound disappointment for the young people at the very outset of their career. According to our data, only in $\frac{1}{2}$ of the working youth does their profession coincide with the one which they acquired during the period of instruction in the PTU, technical school or VUZ. According to the self-assessment of the young persons, 27 percent of them were forced to work in a lower skill than they had acquired during their studies. Approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ of the young persons who began their labor life in the last 2 or 3 years would change their profession, namely: 48 percent of the workers, 46 percent of the engineer and technical personnel and 57 percent of those working in trade and the service sphere.

Probably the "mechanisms of inhibition" are most clearly apparent in the training of the superior vocational detachment of workers, the engineers. In only 1 out of 5 of the surveyed young specialists did the content of job practice coincide completely with the content of production activities after completing the VUZ. Some 48 percent pointed to a partial coinciding and 34 percent replied that their production experience had nothing in common with their current job. Moreover, 62 percent of the respondents felt that the VUZ had not provided them with the specific knowledge in their specialty. Incidentally, an insufficient level of preparation at times coexists with low skill demands imposed by production. It is hard to say what the cause is here and what the consequence. But it is a fact that only 7 percent of the young engineers questioned pointed to the conformity of the product produced at their enterprises to the world level; the remainder stated more or less a lag. Not 1 out of over 1,000 specialists questioned from various regions of the nation considers the prestige of engineer labor to be high. Less than 10 percent of them viewed their labor activity as unconditionally socially useful and only $\frac{1}{4}$ felt that a higher education was required for the job they were performing. Only 35 percent of the young engineers see an opportunity in the next 2 or 3 years to transfer to a more interesting, specifically engineering job. In the opinion of O. Shkaratan, it is precisely in the first 5-7 years after completing the VUZ that the sharp discrepancy arises in the skill level between the engineers in the USSR and the United States. In the United States there is serious growth while here there is a slow "slide" in a profession.

The absence of sufficient vocational training causes the young people, in using sports language, "to be slow at the gate," and this in a most negative manner is felt in the entire labor career and hence in life as a whole.

Wages

The forms of wages which exist at state enterprises provide little incentive for the people to work efficiently. Such a fact has been noticed by virtually all categories, strata and age groups of the workers. According to the data of a 1990 poll, around 10 percent felt that wages

provided "a great incentive." Wage leveling is mentioned as the main reason. This was pointed out by over 80 percent of those questioned. Formal cost accounting reproduces the wage leveling when the results of an enterprise's operations are determined by the superior bodies and not by a market. The medium and poorer workers stand to benefit economically. Certainly they spend less effort per ruble of wage. A "reverse" competition mechanism is objectively at work and this destroys labor morale. The personnel begins competing not to see who can produce more but who manufactures less product.

One of the manifestations of the "reverse" competition is the practice of restriction or the unannounced setting of rules of conduct by which one is considered unloyal toward one's comrades by showing too much endeavor and overfulfilling the output norms. According to our data, approximately $\frac{2}{3}$ of the workers share the opinion that it is not advantageous to significantly overfulfill the quotas for this leads to an automatic drop in the rates. As a rule, this is the opinion of the middle-aged worker categories, that is, the skilled personnel.

Thus, superimposed on the first delay, the "slow start," is another one encountered at the height of the labor career. This is the question of delayed remuneration, unjust wages and the conscious holding down of the wage ceiling by the management.

Research has shown the presence of significant reserves in production. Merely by intensification labor productivity could be raised by 1.5-fold. As a minimum the workers are ready to increase their output by the same amount with the appropriate wage.

Young workers respond to wages even more acutely and judge these more negatively. Such a fact has been generally known, although sociologists have explained it often proceeding from oversimplified approaches. Certainly it is not an issue so much as the unique awareness of the youth or the presence of a certain extremism and negativism in their perception of the world. It is not even a question that the youth is receiving fewer skilled workers with experience. Unfortunately, the logic of vocational and social advancement is not considered.

What specifically is the issue here? Let us clarify who should be considered in the category of young workers. The question is a far from formal one. In the statistical references, the category "youth" usually considers persons under the age of 30. For example, persons from 14 to 28 years of age can become members of a youth political organization of the Komsomol type. As we can see, the age spread is rather large. It is so broad that it brings together persons who have different economic and social interest, needs and goals. The working youth 17-18 years of age is one thing and those 25-29 years of age are quite different. Although precisely these age groups, as the research data indicate, demonstrate the highest level of dissatisfaction with the job, material situation and wages. They are very critical of the management and shortcomings in production.

Among the 18-year-olds, this is explained chiefly by difficulties of vocational development, familiarization with a strange environment and adaptation to production requirements. Among the "older" youth, labor motivation begins to be influenced by factors lying outside the production sphere and namely family and everyday needs. An unique scissors arises as by the age of 25, as an average, a person begins to earn more than before but his income drops in relation to expenditures on supporting a family and the birth of children.

How does this turn up in figures? According to the data of our research conducted in 1988-1989 in Moscow, the average wages of workers and white collar personnel at an age under the age of 20 was 125 rubles a month and their income, considering family status, was 103 rubles. For workers 21-25 years of age, with an increase in wages up to 130 rubles, income per family member increased to 117 rubles. But then look what happens subsequently. For the workers 26-30 years of age, with an increase in wages to 165 rubles a month, the per capita income declines to 106 rubles. For those 31-35 years of age, average wages and per capita income are respectively 180 and 98 rubles. In the age group of 36-40 years, these are 230 and 99 rubles. In the older age groups, the trend changes and there is a simultaneous increase in both wages and per capita income. The sad but very widespread joke that "in a family only the first 20 years are hard" is confirmed by the results of scientific research.

The housing problem seriously complicates the situation. But this is a question of a separate discussion. Here I would merely point out that in the case of per capita income, noticeable improvements occur for persons who have reached 35-40 years of age.

However, the problem is not just one of quantitative characteristics, that is, low wages and a miserly family income. Although this has now become an acute social problem. Certainly a definite income level is essential for the normal reproduction of the labor force and for again providing normal mobility by evening out the starting opportunities of the youth belonging to the various social groups in society. It is not a question of leveling the income of the different-aged workers. Possibly the gap in wages will increase further with the transition to a market economy. But there is nothing bad in this. Wages must rise for all categories of workers. Without this it is impossible to count on the introduction of the innovations of the scientific and technical revolution as it would be better to use cheap manpower.

In wages one must clearly delimit economic incentives and social security. At present, they are mixed together. As a result, if neither one carries out its purpose, the wage system as a whole is inefficient.

What must be created for the normal passage of a person's labor career? It is essential to know firmly what a person receives for his labor as a worker and what he can count on as a member of society. Including also as the representative of one or another demographic group. In my view, it would

be economically more advisable and socially more justifiable to pay people openly and on legitimate rights for the number of years employed and thereby in a veiled manner redistribute the wage fund and keep pensioners "afloat." They should be earning well before retiring on a pension. In practice the management "gives a lift to the elderly," for example, by reassigning advantageous and disadvantageous jobs, assigning job categories, and making promotions depending upon length of employment and not upon end results. Such a "dole" is a vestige of our patriarchal system which in a surprising way coexisted with the ideology of superrevolutionariness (in fact, barracks communism). The protective and restrictive approach to young workers could be seen in philistine judgments such as "you are still young and you can live on this wage."

And so we have the following picture. Along with the official principles of payment supposedly according to labor, there are also informal standards, a sort of improper relationship and this to a greater degree than the official standards influence the conduct of people. Certainly, it is a question not of psychology, although the patriarchal traditions are persistent, but rather of economic practice. It is precisely this which distorts the trajectory of a path in life and forces people to construct their labor career by infinite adaptation to the production organization, in relying here not so much on their professional skills as upon their ability to satisfy the leadership, that is, to promptly join the ranks of the active social activists, to join the "ruling" group or offer oneself to its service. In other words, without overburdening oneself with work to calmly wait for promotion in a transition to a more privileged age category.

Let me be correctly understood. The privileges of the senior age categories are very relative. The 40-year-olds are actually solving "youth" problems still but with a delay of 10-15 years. To obtain an apartment at the age of 40 with having almost adult children—can this be considered really a major success in life? The apartment is needed at the age of 25, when one is getting married and one would prefer to live as an independent family. But as a rule, one must not count on the receiving or purchasing of housing in this period. Our human orientations from the very outset are determined by the relationships of distribution and not "earnability." This gives rise, on the one hand, to parasitism and unjustified claims in choosing a vocation and on the other, to mistrust in one's own forces and disappointment in the possibilities of professional growth and an adequate assessment of the labor contribution.

Let me repeat again. The main thing is not to justly distribute the meager resources of society but rather that people work more and better, in relying on their own forces, professional knowledge and abilities so that they can consciously organize their own life and destiny.

As to the factors which shape a labor career, for now one can speak of a mechanism of inhibition. It is a matter of semifeudal dependence which is imposed at the age of 16 by the registration system, of an undeveloped structure for

crediting the private interests of people, of a senseless practice of giving away housing, and the absence of the necessary social guarantees and at the same time, one of a developed system of bribes in the form of coupons, free trips and other benefits which the people have long since earned.

The point of my arguments is seen in establishing the validity and necessity of a view of the economy from the standpoint of human fate. The transition to a market economy is completely essential but it must not be felt that this automatically will solve all problems. Of course, a definite economic base will arise for introducing responsive "human technologies." As is happening, for example, in Japan or the United States where they have worked out and are constantly improving not only the strategy for shaping an ideal labor career, but also tactical variations for realizing it considering the starting opportunities, national features and social conditions. For our nation it is also essential to form a system of social and economic standards which would serve as guidelines for a person on his path of life. If, for instance, a person has chosen a worker career, then he should know that at the age of 20 (the times depend upon the vocation) he can obtain a skill which would provide material independence and after the age of 25 maintain a family budget on an acceptable level even with the birth of a child. The choice of a specialty requiring a longer period of instruction defers the achieving of certain social standards but does provide an opportunity in the long run to achieve other, higher standards, including by mastering a prestigious, creative profession.

In working out the models of a labor career as a system of economic and social standards, it would clearly be advisable to consider the national and historical features of our nation and its individual regions. This was how they proceeded in Japan where the economy has successfully integrated communal values. The United States is another example. Here the emphasis has been put on the desire for individual success and failures in a labor career are perceived as personal insolvency. Let us hope that with the return to a normal economy the life of people will follow the laws of a normal human fate.

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The Peak of Tension in the Year of the Horse

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[Article by Vladimir Olegovich Rukavishnikov, doctor of philosophical sciences and group leader at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; he has been repeatedly published in our journal]

[Text] While 5 or 10 years ago the phrase "social tension" was virtually absent in the vocabulary of the Soviet people, over the last 2 or 3 years it has become a customary description of the situation which has come into being in the course of perestroika around us. Just what does this intuitively clear concept mean? What is its content? In our scientific literature, as a bibliographic search has shown, up to now special works have been lacking on the given question. Incidentally, this is not surprising. Soviet social scientists only recently have been concerned with studying such phenomena. The current article presents the first results from carrying out the scientific research project on "The Dynamics of the Positions of Social Groups and Communities and Social Tension" carried out by the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences as part of the Program of the Department of Philosophy and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences "Social Development of Soviet Society: Indicators and Trends" and which began in April 1989.

In the autumn of 1989 and the spring (May) of 1990, in accord with the program of the scientific research project, mail questionnaires were sent out to the urban population of the nation as well as polls of the employed population of Gorkiy Oblast and the Kalmyk ASSR. In Gorkiy Oblast the poll was conducted in the autumn of 1989 in the city of Gorkiy and in the spring of 1990 in the towns of Gorkiy, Bor and other rural population points (settlements) and the volumes of the sampling aggregates were respectively 330 and 442 persons. In the Kalmyk ASSR, in the towns of Elista, Gorodovikovo and Kaspiysk, the sampling volume was 375 and 329 persons. In the mail poll 2,228 persons participated in the autumn and 1,790 persons in the spring and they were adult residents of over 750 population points in the nation, including all the oblast centers. The distribution of answers from the participants of the mail poll, the Gorkiy residents and the inhabitants of Kalmykia can be explained by both regional features in the sociopolitical situation as well as by differences in the structures of the sample aggregates and the methods of collecting the

information. The aggregate of participants in the mail poll differed from the two above-named in the fact that it included a significantly higher share of persons with a higher and incomplete higher education and young persons. Due to the designated skew, it can be considered representative only in terms of the socially active portion of the working population. The aggregate of participants in the mail poll satisfactorily reproduced the ratio of the individual weights of the urban population in the Union republics. Persons with a mastery of Russian answered the questionnaires.

A comparison of the obtained data provides an opportunity to draw definite conclusions on the dynamics, trends and nature of the views, positions and judgments most widespread in our society and obtain approximate quantitative assessments of the structure of mass awareness. It was not possible to assign various positions to categories of persons distributed along traditional sociodemographic features in any rigid or uniform manner and for this reason in the subsequent analysis in using the poll results we will rely on data characterizing the distribution of replies from the sampling aggregates of the respondents as a whole, considering the regional differences.

Social Tension—Concept and Phenomenon

Social tension, in being apparent primarily on the sociopsychological level, is characterized, in the first place, by the fact that in the broadest circles of the public a mood of dissatisfaction is widespread over the existing state of affairs in vitally important spheres of social life (this, according to the poll data, is primarily dissatisfaction with a rapid rise in prices, inflation, the depleting of the consumer market, the polluting of the environment as well as in a number of regions by the increased crime rate, unemployment, difficulties in finding jobs and the vocational training of youth and so forth) and a mood of dissatisfaction with social order in the broad sense of the word. Secondly, by the fact that under the influence of the above-named attitudes, confidence in the authorities is lost, the authority of power and the power of authority are reduced, the sensation of security disappears and pessimistic assessments of the future and all sorts of rumors are widespread, that is, in society as a whole (or in a separate territorial community) an atmosphere arises of mass mental disquiet and emotional excitement.

Social tension is also reflected and manifested not only in social attitudes, but also in mass actions such as speculating, the hoarding of goods and food products, in the enforced and voluntary migration of significant groups of persons to other regions or overseas, in the sharp intensification of activities of various sociopolitical movements, in the struggle for power and influence in the masses, in the actions of extremist groups, in spontaneous and organized meetings, demonstrations, strikes and other forms of civil disobedience.

Social tension, as a process, cannot help but have stages which differ in terms of their space-time parameters and forms of expression. In our opinion, there are three stages. The first in the course of which there is a rise in dissatisfaction which is still concealed from outside observers. Characteristic of this is an unorganized, chiefly verbal form of expressing dissatisfaction and concern over the multiplying disturbances of the customary course of things without any clear awareness of the causes and scale of changes occurring in social life. This stage can be called "grumbling in the kitchen or conversations in the smoking room."

The second is the stage of exacerbation and peak of tension. Its distinguishing feature is a clear awareness of the abnormality of the existing situation and the presence of social tension in society by a majority of the population. All the above-named features of a state of tension are present. Characteristic of this stage is the rise of centers (zones) of a sharp exacerbation of tension in individual regions and population points with a high level of tension existing everywhere in the nation. The third stage is a reduction (decline or elimination) of the tension, and a gradual disappearance of the features characteristic of this state of social life.

Social tension, like any other social phenomenon, has its own intrinsic mechanism of occurrence, objective and subjective components in the system of factors and conditions which give rise to it, common preconditions and local factors which operate in each specific combination of circumstances of place and time. Its most general preconditions are a persistent and long unresolved discrepancy between the needs, interests and social expectations of the entire mass of significant part of the population and the degree of their actual satisfaction leading to the build-up of dissatisfaction, to increased aggressiveness of individual groups and categories of people and to growing psychic fatigue and irritability.

Social tension can arise in a society (territorial community) in a dual manner. In the first place, if a majority of the people is initially hazily aware and then as events develop realizes that the satisfying of their social, economic, political, nationality, cultural or any other vitally important needs, interests and rights is being jeopardized or is even becoming impossible. Secondly, when a certain, initially comparatively small part of the people cannot satisfy their needs and realize their interests under the conditions existing in the society and for this reason, regardless of for what reasons and how specifically such a situation was caused, enters into battle against the actual and apparent obstacles or the perceived encroachment of their rights the spread of a mood of dissatisfaction, fear, pessimism and so forth in society. In either version social tension arises if the ripening crisis is not detected promptly and the conflicting opposition is in no way resolved; if so to speak a "hopeless situation" is observed or a blind alley in the logical development of social processes.

Thus, social tension is an aspect, an indicator of social crisis and conflict. It arises when crisis phenomena are not yet apparent in a clearly detectable form, and when there is no clearly felt opposition between "we and them," and disappears only when the crisis has been resolved or the conflict exhausted.

In summing all that was mentioned above, it can be said that social tension is a concept characterizing a particular state of social life which is marked by an exacerbation of internal contradictions of an objective and subjective nature (and let us add, aggravated in a number of instances by the action of external circumstances of a different nature, for example, natural disasters, accidents and so forth). The deep-seated causes of the given phenomenon are an aggregate of economic, political, social and other processes the course and direction of which lead to the rise in society of an unstable (political, economic or military) or conflict situation. These form as it were the "background" against which the specific events are played out. Against this background of the fundamental tension, often the action of local factors is superimposed (including the actions of the mass information media, extremist and nationalistic groups, causing actions by the local authorities and so forth) causing an aggravation of the situation at one or another moment of time in the various regions of the nation.

Dynamics of Social Tension

The statistical data, content analysis of publications in newspapers and journals and the results of polls make it possible to judge the dynamics of social tension in the course of perestroika and the character of the reflection of this situation in the public mind.

The first 2 or 3 years of perestroika were marked by increased hopes and expectations of rapid changes for the better, the emancipation of the public mind, and its liberation from the lethargic sleep of stagnation. The broadening of glasnost, the reduction of the "zones closed to criticism," the struggle against corruption, the winding down of the Afghan campaign and the improving of relations with the West were that basis on which the "superintendents of perestroika" received the credit of the people's trust. In the vocabulary of politicians and journalists concerned with domestic affairs, the term "social tension" during those years was virtually absent.

However, time passed and hopes were replaced by disillusionment. The Decree of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies "On the Basic Directions of USSR Domestic and Foreign Policy" (June 1989) stated that perestroika had evoked great hopes but had not brought the expected results, particularly in the economic and social spheres. Certain problems had even become more aggravated, in intensifying social tension in society. Thus, the presence of a state of social tension in the nation gained official recognition on the highest level.

At present, we are confronted with all the above-listed indications of a peak of tension including the characteristics of a sociopsychological atmosphere, public attitudes, as well as objective data of socioeconomic and criminal statistics indicating a deepening of the crisis and a sharp rise in infractions and crimes. The voter polls in the course of preparations for the elections held in March of the current year for the republic and local soviets as conducted by the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and by other organizations in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia and Uzbekistan indicated that everywhere a predominant majority of those polled were dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the economy, their own well-being and did not see positive changes in the supply of consumer goods and food, an improvement in the ecological situation, in providing law and order or in the work of the local party and soviet bodies. The share of residents from different regions who voiced negative judgments on all the above-named questions is close to the maximum possible and for this reason it is possible to assert that such attitudes are characteristic of virtually and entire adult population of the nation [1].

Feelings of dissatisfaction with the state of affairs on the consumer market, the decline in the standard of living, and uncertainty of tomorrow were apparent indirectly in the distributions of answers to the question "If circumstances allowed you, what would you prefer to move to a different place or continue living where you live now?" Without being able here to analyze in detail these data on a regional breakdown (the regions of the exacerbation of interethnic relations stand out in comparison with others), let us give the general data: 27 percent of the participants of the mail poll wanted to move to another region or city of the nation in the autumn while the figure was 18 percent in the spring;

in addition, and this is particularly alarming, respectively 12 and 26(!) percent preferred to emigrate.¹ Also alarming is the fact that emigre attitudes were rather widespread among the socially active, highly skilled portion of the youth and middle-aged persons. If one considers that a new, more democratic and liberal law on entry and departure from the USSR is soon to be passed, one can draw a rather definite forecast. With the existing, let us say frankly, disgusting conditions of life, our fatherland may lack many energetic and enterprising persons who are particularly essential to our society now.

In society there is a growing concern for the heightening social tension in the center and on the spot (Table 1). The tension is exacerbated by the instability, by the crisis of power and the party, and by the growing struggle of the various sociopolitical forces over the fundamental questions of the future development of the nation. The economic and social problems in the minds of people have assumed a clearly expressed political hue. The dissatisfaction of the public over the supply of food products and consumer goods, the deteriorating ecological situation and increased crime is being shifted to the attitude toward the existing structures of power and administration, to the ruling party. This is a comparatively new and alarming aspect, since according to the data of the polls conducted in the autumn of last year, social tension which also existed at that time was also linked in the public mind primarily to factors of an economic sort (an unsatisfactory state of the consumer market, increased prices, inflation and so forth), with the state of the environment, by the unsolved housing problem, by the increasing number of infractions of the law and by the exacerbation of interethnic relations and only then by the course of perestroika and the domestic political situation in the country.

Table 1: Distribution of Replies to the Question "Do you feel that there is social tension in the city where you live?..." %

Variations	Mail Poll of USSR Urban Population (n=1,790 persons)	Poll of Employed Population in Gorkiy Oblast (n=442 persons)	Poll of Employed Urban Population of Kalmyk ASSR (n=329 persons)
Absent	12	10	19
Declined in comparison with last year	4	0.6	3
Maintained on same level as last year	33	21	41
Intensified in comparison with last year	51	68	37

Attitude Toward the Government

A sharply critical view prevails in the attitude toward the USSR government and the measures proposed by it to get out of the crisis in society. As follows from the data of Table 2, the share of those who positively view the

government policy is extremely small and is substantially lower than the share of those who consider the practical activities and/or the program of the government to be a failure and even assumes that the current government could retire as incapable of resolving the problems confronting the nation.

Table 2: Distribution of Replies to the Question "What is your opinion on the current USSR government?", %

Variations	Mail Poll of USSR Urban Population as a Whole (n=1,790 persons)	In RSFSR*	Poll of Employed Population of Gorkiy Oblast (n=442 persons)	Poll of Employed Urban Population of Kalmyk ASSR (n=329 persons)
Government is basically carrying out correct policy and although significant difficulties are being encountered in the process of realizing it, positive results have already been achieved	6	6	7	21
Government has good ideas but is unable to realize them	32	30	41	41
Both government policy (the program of measures) and how it is being carried out cause many doubts in me	27	25	18	20
Current government incapable of solving problems confronting the nation, it should retire	30	33	26	12
Other opinion	4	3	0	1
Hard to answer	1	3	8	5

* The share of RSFSR respondents was 61 percent.

The polls conducted in Gorkiy Oblast in May, before the well-known speech of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Comrade N.I. Ryzhkov, at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the ways of moving to a market economy and the ensuing rise of prices—in June—approximately a month after the speech of the prime minister, provided an unique opportunity to "weigh" the given unpopular proposal by the government. Among the Gorkiy workers the share of "supporters" of the government (the respondents who chose the first variation of the answer to the question of Table 2) declined from 6 percent to 5 percent, while the "opponents" who felt that the government should step down (version 4 of the answer, Table 2) rose from 28 percent to 35 percent; among the intelligentsia in the humanities the change was respectively from 9 to 5 percent and from 27 to 34 percent; among engineers and technical personnel, from 3 to 4 percent and from 32 to 36 percent. Thus, there is an alarming tendency for a growing negative-critical attitude toward the current Ryzhkov Cabinet.

Attitude Toward Strikes

The process of the politization of mass awareness and conduct is clearly apparent in the change in the attitude of broad strata of the workers toward strikes as a form of struggle for their rights. A majority of those polled in the spring of 1990 felt that the holding of strikes in our nation was a justified measure. We would point out that according to the data of the mail poll conducted in the autumn of last year, public opinion toward strikes at that

time was split into two approximately equal parts of supporters and opponents for such a method of resolving conflicts. The source of the changed attitude of the workers toward the strike form of struggle undoubtedly is not only an awareness of the real strength of worker solidarity, a close linkage of personal and group interests, the impossibility of achieving changes for the better by other ways and the effectiveness of the strike means of applying pressure to the government, but also the decline in the confidence in the party, soviet and economic bodies at the center and on the spot.

The poll recorded a high degree of strike readiness (Table 3). In assessing this fact it is essential to bear in mind that the organizational structures of the new worker movement to a significant degree have already been formed, their active cooperation with the new democratic sociopolitical movements and parties is already being organized, on the one hand, and a certain confrontation with the CPSU apparatus is surviving, on the other. Among the most decided detachments of the working class, and primarily the miners, there has been a complete loss of trust in the government, and the authority of the central power, in particular the CPSU leadership, is low. There is a high probability that the potentially high strike readiness will be transformed into real strike activity. Here the strikes will have a political nature and significant scope. In the event of the start of a large-scale protest strike against the unpopular government measures, the failure of the leadership of the nation or a sector to carry out previously given obligations and so forth, this can assume the scale of a universal political strike.

Table 3: Replies to the Question "If you consider it fair to have strikes in our nation, are you ready to personally participate in a strike?", %

Variations	Mail Poll of USSR Urban Population as a Whole (n=1,790 persons)	In RSFSR*	Poll of Employed Population of Gorkiy Oblast (n=442 persons)	Poll of Employed Urban Population of Kalmyk ASSR (n=329 persons)
Yes, I am ready and I will strike along with my comrades out of a feeling of solidarity even if I have my own different opinion on this strike	11	12	10	13
Yes, but only in a strike conducted within the limits of the law, if there is no other solution to the conflict and I share the demands for which the strike has been declared	49	48	33	34
I do not know—I am not ready now to uniformly answer this question; my decision would be determined by specific circumstances	21	28	16	10
Most likely not—I would prefer not to participate in a strike, as I assume the possibility of unpleasant consequences in the future for me and my family	4	5	3	6
No, since I do not believe that we can achieve anything by strikes	11	4	24	35
Other opinion	4	3	3	1

* Share of RSFSR respondents was 61 percent

Social Pessimism

Social expectations, as is known, reflect the attitude toward the events and processes of the possible future. These are definite emotionally colored views which characterize the psychological atmosphere of society. The data of the 1989 and 1990 polls indicate that there is a definite trend for a rise in pessimistic expectations in relation to a rapid change in the situation in the nation to the better.

Indicative in this regard is the fact that according to the opinion of a majority, the results of the recently held elections to the republic and local soviets will not lead to real changes for the better, regardless of the substantial replacement and change in the composition of the deputy corps. Among the participants of the mail poll, 16 percent assumed that a deepening of the crisis cannot be halted and after the elections the changes will be for the worse; for 46 percent everything remains as before, without marked positive changes and only 9 percent is hopeful of tangible changes for the better, since, in their opinion, persons knowing the problems of their voters and capable of fighting for their interests have been elected to the soviets (29 percent refused a definite forecast of the development of events). Real power, in the opinion of those polled, as before does not belong to the soviets.² In this regard the results of the May poll did not differ from the data of polls conducted in December 1989-February 1990 during the period of the election campaign.

Attitude Toward the Socialist Choice

The general crisis in the world system of socialism, the transition of a number of communist parties in the Eastern European countries to the opposition and their

loss of not only the status of a ruling party but also their influence in the masses, and the unmasking of the crimes of Stalinism have intensified the feeling of disappointment of many as to the correctness of the path along which the communist party led the nation over the last 72 years. In a number of instances the forms of expression for these feelings have a clearly expressed antisocialist hue. Without any stipulations the slogan that "our society is emerging on the path of humane democratic socialism" is shared by only about 10 percent of those questioned (in a number of regions the share of such persons was significantly less). Those polled pointed out that they do not understand just how humane and democratic socialism differs from the developed socialism "built" in our country. Equally small is the number of those who unconditionally support the directly opposite viewpoint of a complete change in the course of social development in our nation, that is, persons who agree fully with the assertion that "the USSR is moving from socialism to capitalism." The incomplete process of a revision of views concerning the future of the nation and the transforming of political ideas and values can be seen from the very high share of supporters of a "third path" or the viewpoint according to which "we are on the path to a new social system which is unlike either socialism or capitalism in the traditional understanding," on the one hand, and the comparatively large share of persons who refuse a direct answer to this question or who have chosen the cautious position of "partially agreeing" with the polar statements (see Table 4). As one of the respondents explained his replies, "we are familiar with real socialism and would like to bid it farewell more quickly but we do not clearly understand just what modern capitalism is and we are rather afraid."

Table 4: Answers to the Question "Decisions taken in recent months are capable of radically altering the customary traits of the social system in our nation. You certainly have given some thought to where we are going. To what degree do you agree with the polemical statements given below?", %

Positions	Variations of Answers	Mail Poll of Urban Population		Poll of Employed Population of Gorkiy Oblast (n=442 persons)	Poll of Employed Urban Population of Kalmyk ASSR (n=329 persons)
		USSR as a Whole (n-1,790 persons)	RSFSR*		
Our society is emerging on a path of humane democratic socialism	Completely agree	6	6	4	14
	Partially agree	36	36	31	28
	Disagree	44	46	21	27
	Hard to answer	14	12	44	31
USSR is moving from socialism to capitalism	Completely agree	10	11	15	14
	Partially agree	34	34	28	33
	Disagree	43	44	20	28
	Hard to answer	13	11	37	25
We are on the path to a new social system which is unlike either socialism or capitalism in a traditional understanding	Completely agree	36	35	28	25
	Partially agree	36	36	26	27
	Disagree	17	18	9	10
	Hard to answer	11	11	37	38

* The share of RSFSR respondents is 61 percent.

In light of what has been stated above, there is no particular surprise from the fact that a majority of those questioned in May 1990 in no way linked their expectations for positive changes in the future to the decisions of the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress. The people much more linked their hopes to the activities of the USSR President, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the newly elected republic and local soviets as well as to the activities of the new parties and sociopolitical movements.

The Balance of Political Sympathies

The successes of Soviet policy in establishing civilized relations with the United States and the other capitalist states clearly have been one other incentive in shifting the center of attention of public opinion from the foreign policy problems to domestic problems, to the questions of the theory and strategy of the nation's future development. The decisions adopted in recent months have urged a radical change in the customary traits of the social system in our country. There has been a collapse in the system of stereotypes and values customary for many, of the notion introduced by official propaganda into mass conscience of the indisputable advantage of the socialist system in comparison with the capitalist and the inevitability of a communist future for all mankind. It was asserted that in the peaceful competition between the two systems, a victory for socialism was inevitable as socialism would provide higher productivity of social labor and better living conditions, it would destroy

exploitation of man by man based on private ownership, it would eliminate unemployment and crime and provide for all equal rights and opportunities in obtaining jobs, housing, free education, medical services, access to cultural values and so forth, and so forth. The practice of socialism has shown that many of the promises were unfulfilled. Moreover, over the last 2 or 3 years as formulas for pulling the nation out of its crisis, the leaders of perestroika and the mass information media proposed using means which yesterday were declared to be unsuitable and inapplicable under the conditions of socialism. It is a question of introducing a pluralism of ownership and returning to economic life the institution of private property, attracting foreign capital, developing market relations with all the ensuing consequences including inevitable unemployment, a rise in property and social inequality and so forth. The verbose arguments "pro" and "contra" for the proposed reforms in no way helped to introduce clarity into the notion of the future appearance of our country.

Mass conscience at present is an unique cocktail of old views and ideas learned from school years concerning the merits of the socialist choice and the more realistic assessments of the real results of peaceful rivalry between the two socioeconomic systems, the standard of living for the citizens in the socialist and capitalist states and the democratization of society.

The mosaic-like picture of mass political awareness is largely explained by the difficulties of ideological and

political self-determination of each member of our society in such a rapidly changing situation. In answering the question "Which of the sociopolitical associations, print organs, which of the persons known in terms of their political views do you consider extreme left, left, center, right and extreme right?" many of the poll participants pointed out that the traditional notions of right and left are not applicable to our party, for our "left," in defending the ideals of freedom and democracy, at the same time profound views to which many neoconservatives in the West would subscribe in standing there on the right flank and conversely, the zealous defenders of the course of continuing the construction of communism in a separate nation energetically and quickly are drifting to the flank usually occupied in the parliaments of the West by the opponents of change, by the conservatives and not by the communists or the representatives of other leftist forces. Nevertheless, the sympathies of the public to a greater degree belong to the left, or more accurately to the supporters of change, than to their opponents.

Only about 3 percent of those questioned identified their political position as being on the right flank. Many more persons consider themselves "left," some 15-30 percent depending upon the region where the poll was taken. A majority (50-70 percent) pointed out that at present they could not classify themselves in any one of the above-named areas.

The political position of the respondents and their ideological identification to a significant degree determine the assessment of the ability of various political forces to bring the nation out of crisis. At the same time, it is indisputable that in the structure of public opinion the distribution of political sympathies is determined by the interaction of various factors. In many cases preference among alternatives is given to new forces merely because the old structures and institutions have proven their insolvency. The vector of sympathies is often determined by the hope for change and in no way by a knowledge of theoretical and ideological platforms.

A comparison of the results of the polls conducted in the autumn of 1989 and the spring of 1990 has shown that in the lapsed months there were no substantial changes in the distribution of political sympathies. This fact shows that the influence of the political situation and of specific circumstances of place and time on the attitude toward traditional and new forces is in no way as substantial as might be expected.

Our data provide an opportunity to assess the share of "supporters and sympathizers" and the share of "opponents" of the new actors on the political scene, the "informal associations." In the former category, one can put around 40 percent of those polled, including approximately 10 percent of those firmly convinced that "at present only the informal groups (people's fronts and so forth) are capable of undertaking real measures and decisively carry out a line of improving affairs in the nation" (we kept the wording of the reply offered in the

questionnaire). In the second category are persons who assume that "the people's fronts and other informal groups merely aggravate the difficulties, for ultimately they are fighting for power" (as given in the questionnaire). Among these approximately $\frac{1}{3}$ (plus or minus 5 percent) of those questioned agree fully with the above-given wording, plus approximately the same number share this partially.

Certainly the above-given dividing into two parts is very approximate and rough. The proportions for the carriers of various political sympathies are extremely mobile and are determined primarily by the position of the "vacillators," the persons who "partially agree" with one or another of the above-given views. The share of persons undetermined in their position is very significant and is at least $\frac{1}{3}$ of the total number of persons polled.

Interethnic Conflicts and the Refugee Problem

The tragic events occurring in the regions of the greatest exacerbation of social tension—the regions of overt interethnic clashes—constantly remain at the center of public attention. In giving rise to all sorts of rumors and conjectures concerning the causes and scale of what had happened as well as the possibility of new outbursts of violence in other places, they to a significant degree contribute to the rise of concern among people in all regions of the nation.

Both in 1989 and in 1990, less than 10 percent of those polled (40-50 percent) were "partially" satisfied and all the remainder were unsatisfied) with the objectivity, completeness and timeliness of information concerning the situation in the "hot spots" of the nation as obtained from the newspapers and from the radio and TV broadcasts. The half-truth in the mass information media combined with hundreds of thousands of refugees who were the objective witnesses to the inability of the authorities to control the development of events and protect the security and life of the citizens in no way has helped to reduce social tension.

In the opinion of the participants of the 1990 mail poll, responsibility for the situations leading to the pogroms and the evacuation of thousands of persons from their home areas should be borne by the republic and local authorities (28 percent of those polled felt this way), by the nationalistic groupings (23 percent), the central authorities (17 percent), the law enforcement bodies (13 percent) and the criminal elements (11 percent). The remaining persons questioned found it hard to answer this question. Funds for providing the refugees with material compensation, housing, jobs and domestic services should be provided, in the opinion of a majority (73 percent), from the budget of the republic in which the refugees lived previously. An insignificant portion of those questioned (14 percent) felt that for this purpose money of the all-Union budget could also be employed. Opinions as to where in the next few years the refugees should be located and how this part of the problem must be solved were grouped basically around two opinions:

"It is essential to create conditions for the departure and residing of refugees in any region at their choice" (42 percent) and "It is essential to create opportunities for the return of the refugees" (39 percent).

The use of the armed forces in emergency situations within the country gave rise to stormy debates even after the lamentably known Tbilisi events of 1989. The poll disclosed the viewpoints which have formed up to the present. The viewpoint of the relative minority is that "the USSR Armed Forces cannot be outside political life. In the necessary instances they are obliged to intervene and apply force in order to defend the USSR Constitution, the security and rights of the Soviet citizens." From 33 to 29 percent of those polled feel this way in various regions of the country. The opposing viewpoint is "the army is to be outside political life. The USSR Armed Forces should not be involved in situations involving interethnic relations and other conflicts within the nation." This is directly supported by approximately the same number of respondents. Also gravitating to this position is the group which included a majority of those questioned who voiced their opinion on the given problem (45 percent): "Within the nation in accord with the law only the Interior Troops of the MVD should be employed. Each combat arms should be concerned with its own matters." In the commentaries to the questionnaires it was emphasized that the Interior Troops should consist of volunteer professionals and young persons should not be called up to serve in these units in accord with the Law on Universal Military Service.

The "de Tocqueville Effect"

Perestroika can be boldly termed a revolution of rising expectations. Clearly, at present in mass conscience, one can observe what in political science is sometimes termed the "de Tocqueville effect." It derives its name from Alexis de Tocqueville, a French historian, sociologist and politician of the 19th Century and author of the book "The Ancient Regime and the Revolution." He wrote that the evil which was patiently endured as something inevitable seemed intolerable with the notion that one could escape from it. But then, the wise scholar pointed out, as many abuses as are eliminated, the remainder are all the more apparent and a feeling of intolerability of the evil becomes more burning: feudalism in the flowering of its forces never inspired such hate in the French as on the eve of its disappearance; the most insignificant manifestations of the tyranny of Louis XVI seemed more intolerable than the despotism of Louis XIV.

The process of actively introducing various strata and groups of the population to the role as principals of mass political activity has been occurring against the background of a crisis in the traditional political ideas and stereotypes which were formed in the most general outlines during the cult of personality of Stalin and were reinforced over the long years of stagnation. This circumstance to a decisive degree also determines the political culture of modern Soviet society, as

well as the attitude toward the direction and rate of occurring changes. A portion of the people has still not escaped from the fear and, in replying to the questionnaire questions in 1990, pointed out that they feared that glasnost would be followed by a new wave of witch-hunting. Another, in no way small, group of respondents—the disappointed and angered citizens—in their commentaries to the replies inclined to an extremely oversimplified interpretation of complex sociopolitical problems and proposed rectilinear and strong-armed methods of resolving them, reproducing the demagogic slogans of the ultraradical or, on the contrary, conservative or even reactionary forces.

The people are worried. Indicative in this regard are the answers to the question over the matter of rumors concerning the possibility of a military coup in our country. Approximately every third or fifth person questioned assumed the possibility of such development of events, linking the possibility of action by the military to the instability of the political and economic situation in the nation as well as to the struggle for power by various currents within the superior leadership.

Every 3 out of 100 persons questioned felt that "this would be the salvation for the nation for only the army is capable now of instilling order." A significantly larger number of persons felt that such rumors were either "completely ungrounded stupidity, idle conjecture which could never happen" (18-30 percent) or that "this was antiarmy propaganda carried out by certain forces interested in destabilizing the situation in the nation" (16-25 percent).

We do not have the opportunity to comment in detail on the disclosed distribution of opinions. We would also point out that the introduction of the new institution for our political system of the USSR President was also judged differently by public opinion and is linked to the course of perestroika. After 100 days of the presidency of M.S. Gorbachev, almost 1/2 of those questioned to one degree or another agreed with the opinion that "perestroika is degenerating into a dictatorship of personal power" (the share of "disagreeing" was 17-26 percent, while 11-32 percent found it difficult to answer).

A further democratization of society, in the opinion of the majority of the respondents, is impossible without the direct involvement of all the citizens in running the country by participation in the nationwide referendums but not in the "nationwide discussions" in the press. More than 70 percent of those participating in the polls in 1990 stated unambiguously that they personally were in favor of the referendum.

In concretizing their attitude toward referendums on the most important questions of the life of the nation or republic, 45 percent of the participants in the mail poll pointed out that "this is a democratic method for involving all citizens in running the nation (republic) and 31 percent felt that "this is a method to learn how people actually think,

a method of studying public opinion." And only 14 percent skeptically assumed that "this would be a new propaganda action, an attempt by the authorities to shift responsibility for decision-taking from their shoulders to society." Certain respondents noted the danger that the results of referendums organized by the authorities could be falsified or used against the democratic forces by an ambiguous posing of the question.

* * *

It is said that omens occur even for those who do not believe in them. And those who do not believe in now fashionable horoscopes know that the current year of 1990 according to the Eastern calendar is called the Year of the White Horse. Astrologers assert that at this point in time of the 12- and 60-year cycle related to the position of the sun, the stars, Jupiter and Saturn, important events usually occur on the earth. This is an unique turning point, a moment of change, when responsible decisions are to be taken summing up the results of the previous years and marking a new trajectory in development. The Year of the Horse is compared with the crest of a wave or with a mountain peak, a pass, the reaching and crossing of which will bring the tired travelers to the start of a slow descent in a sun-bathed valley promising the long-awaited rest and peace.

All that has been said above shows that our nation in the Year of the White Horse is at a peak of social tension. An analysis of the reasons for the rise of the crisis phenomena in the USSR and in the other countries of the former socialist commonwealth and the ways of overcoming them goes beyond the limits of the given article. We would merely point out that perestroyka, as a complex of reforms in the various spheres of social life and the breaking of ossified structures, in and of itself is a response of society aimed at overcoming the crisis phenomena. A reduction in social tension in the most immediate manner is tied to the direction, nature, depth, scale and rate of transformations carried out in the process of perestroyka. Much in the further development of the social attitudes and the sociopolitical situation in

the nation will depend upon whose side is the political initiative, and how acceptable for the nation's population will be the measures of the national and republic governments to emerge from the crisis, and how consistently a course supported by the masses will be carried out.

Footnotes

1. Let us recall that among the participants of the mail poll, there was a higher share of young highly-educated persons than in the Gorkiy and Kalmyk samplings. For this reason, the corresponding indicators for the Gorkiy and Kalmyk polls are lower. Among the respondents in Kalmykia in 1989, 24 percent wanted to move to another city or region and 13 percent in 1990; wanting to move abroad were 12 and 10 percent; in Gorkiy Oblast, respectively, 26 and 9, 7 and 6 percent.

2. The participants of the mail poll from the RSFSR to the question: "To whom, in your opinion, does power presently belong in your city (settlement)? (It is possible to give not more than three replies simultaneously.)" replied in the following manner: 9 percent to the soviets, 38 percent to the party bodies, 20 percent to the leaders of enterprises, organizations and departments, 4 percent to the new sociopolitical movements, 23 percent to the traders and representatives of the shadow economy, while the remaining participants (6 percent) found it difficult to answer this question.

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A Nontraditional Method for Analysis of Interparty Struggle

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[Text] The verbatim records from all levels of congresses of the people's deputies provide great informational material for carrying out historical sociological and sociopsychological research. Undoubtedly this is a matter for the future. However, it seems to me that an analysis in the same vein of similar historical precedents can significantly facilitate the work.

Up to now this source has been little used, basically for reconstructing the canvas of events and the programs of the fighting political forces. The use of this in sociological, sociopsychological and sociopolitical research requires the elaboration of a special method. The work has attempted to present such a method drawing on the materials of the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets (6-10 July 1918). This congress was noteworthy for many reasons. It was held at the peak of the political battles between two ruling parties: the Bolsheviks and the Leftist SRs. It particularly attracts our attention as virtually the last record of overt interparty struggle.

Since we are primarily concerned with the link between the leader and the people which comprise the referent group for him, it is possible to employ the psychological concept of G. Kelly [1] who has established three successively "turned-on" functions of interaction. The first is the function of **identification** and this makes it possible for the principal to construct a sensitive image of the group and himself in it through the collective conscience of its members. With the aid of the second, the **normative** or orientation function, there is instruction in group standards making it possible to understand the situation and these standards are reproduced. Finally, the third **reflexive** of comparing and forming assessments and self-judgments and through which the standards are reassessed and subjected to revision. It is not difficult to see that the designated functions correspond to the traditional strata of the psyche traditionally recognized in psychology: the subconscious, the conscious and the self-conscious (in the Hegelian tradition, sensitivity, intellect and reason).

The leader of a group who actively shapes its position clearly should possess the most refined responses in forecasting the conduct of the group and the leaders who are in relationships of collaboration or opposition to him. In this instance, we can speak of the dominance of the third function, that is, of developed self-awareness. The function of the perceptible identification is realized by the means of the subconscious and the normative-regulative making it possible to properly orient oneself in

the world by the conscience (intellect). The leader should be able to actively influence the subconscious, conscious and even the self-conscious of the rank-and-file members of the group, shaping them in the required direction. In turn, the group acts upon the leader, in participating in the evolution of his position through group interests.

We are interested in the means of influence employed by one or another leader in a historically specific sociopolitical situation. This can also provide an indirect description of his referent group.

The deep strata of the psyche, the subconscious, is most easily swayed. Examples of controlled xenophobia are well-known to the older generation. And the label of "enemy of the people," that is, a foreigner who is apriori hostile to the socialist referent culture in the 1930s and 1940s was completely sufficient for a civil death even for a respected member of society who was unmasked at the crucial moment by the powers of the representatives of the referent group in the eyes of its rank-and-file members. An emotional line of reasoning by the undisputed leaders was completely enough, no proof was needed, only a fine show was required which appealed to the senses and merely served as an explanation for what had happened.

It is somewhat more complex to influence the conscious; this is natural in considering its significantly more complex structure. In order to accuse a person of not corresponding to a group on the level of the second function, it is at least essential to demonstrate the discrepancy of his code of standards to the corresponding code of the group. Here qualifications are clearly insufficient and it is essential to show the difference of the standards accepted as a guide to action and do this persuasively. Here the violated standards should be important for all members of the group. The condemned person inevitably must be an enemy spy, the representative of an alien normative orientation, a detail which previously strongly affected me in the corresponding convictions but completely apparent from this viewpoint.

Finally, the self-conscience which presupposes a developed reflex system. Of course, this is the most difficult stratum to influence. Here qualifications and even the demonstrating of the violated standard are completely unpersuasive. It is essential to give extended proof of one's accusations with the logical deriving of the possible consequences of the different standards accepted as the basis of conduct and certainly on the level of this function the distinguishing norm is far from always an indisputable evil. Possibly a change in the norm is only an adequate response to an altered situation. Obviously precisely on the level of the self-conscience and a developed reflection operating with constructions capable of withstanding the fire of criticism and designed for close scrutiny from all sides is a factional struggle carried out under the conditions of real democracy and this, of course, does not exclude the use of the means of the other functions.

The level of difference in the forms of conducting debate and the effect on public opinion in the various referent groups can be an indicator of the degree of development in the sophistication of political discussion.

In the event that the behind-the-scenes and the public debates differ insignificantly and are characterized by a high level of activated functions, one can speak of a developed political sophistication on the scale of the entire nation and a high degree of the democratization of its social life. With their insignificant difference it is possible to conclude that there is political sophistication among the upper groups with little involvement of the uninformed and semisuppressed masses and fraught in the future with the most diverse excesses. Finally, with a weak and comparable level of development of both the former and the latter it is reasonable to conclude that there is a semistified level of political debate, including on the uppermost level, and this is very dangerous.

From this viewpoint, it is interesting to make a comparison of the "circles" within which political debates have been carried out in the various periods of Soviet power. During the years of Stalinism, a discussion of political problems without the voicing of particular approval at best was conducted in the family. During the period of stagnation, there flourished anecdotes and the belittling of authorities within a circle of acquaintances. In our times, all society has been overwhelmed by a flood of the most active public discussion of urgent problems.

Thus, clearly the appropriate party and soviet documents combined with materials of the widely-read press, with the presence of a method of comparative analysis for the degree of using the elements of the first, second and third functions in the debate, can play the role of a barometer for the corresponding intensity of political life, the degree of its development and democraticness.

First of all, the question arises of the search for and consideration of the indicators which could be employed for objectivizing the characteristics of development for one or another function in the interaction of the leader and the other members of the referent group.

Obviously, the researcher should pay particular attention to the moments of the strong manifestation of feelings by the listeners. As a rule, this means that the speaker has been able to touch a sensitive chord and consequently the place in the report which has caused strong emotions is suspicious in the sense of its effect on the deep strata of the psyche, the subconscious. Significant here are both the places which have evoked applause as well as negative emotions, for example, shouts of "Disgrace!" and so forth. Clearly, in various periods the source of applause can differ in terms of the level of the affected levels of the psyche. Thus, while in the first years of Soviet power the listeners responded directly in an emotional manner, indicating with applause what they liked and with shouts of "Disgrace!" respectively for what they did not like, and in the so-called "years of stagnation" applause rang out at the

proper places of a report corresponding to the standard cannons of approbation while unsanctioned shouts of "Disgrace!" were excluded in principle. They approved not what they liked but what they were ordered to like.

Thus, in the first years of Soviet power applause and exclamations, both approving and disapproving, are an indicator suspected of activating the emotional sphere in the psyche of the listeners, during the years of stagnation the same external indicators provide us an opportunity to reconstruct the system of norms which was considered fundamental and necessary.

Indicative from this viewpoint, in our view, is the circumstance that the leaders who densely saturated their speech with political slogans concerning the latest issues and with direct qualifications of their political enemies with sufficient ease evoked applause. This applies above all to such political figures as Zinovyev and Trotskiy. The appearance, for example, of Trotskiy before the rostrum of the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Worker, Peasant, Soldier and Cossack Deputies and used by us as the basic source base inevitably evoked strong emotions from those present. The applause merged with the slogans voiced by him and of which he was a great admirer: "Long live revolutionary discipline! Long live the honest worker-peasant army!" In his speeches he alternated with emotional-conceptual fine images of opponents in the form of the "hired agitators of our enemies" and less comprehensible orders to execute them "on the spot," because "woe to him who disobeys the will of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets." Here everything is done with reference to the authority of the Congress, but in such a manner that the speaker himself is almost the sole proponent of the designated will in life.

Thus, in addition to the **applause and manifestations of negative emotions** by the rank-and-file members of a group, the saturating of the leader's speech with slogans, from the psychological standpoint we obtain two other indicators which characterize the form of struggle. First of all, this is the image of the leader's "ego" presented by him in his speech. In what role does this act? Of course, in a crucial manner if the leader is acting as the savior of the fatherland and the father of the people. Secondly, also very important is the **image of the same leader as depicted by his colleagues**. When Zinovyev said that for Trotskiy "I have unlimited trust which he has merited and does merit" and in this manner responds to the accusations of Kamkov that "the situation which Comrade Trotskiy has described does not correspond to the objective state of affairs there" (on the front.—L.B.) [2, p 24], he is demonstrating the rejection of the words of one and the acceptance of the words of another, in relying on emotional arguments. What Trotskiy says is the truth because I trust him and I do not need any other arguments—this is what Zinovyev is actually saying. And it is no surprise that the response to such an emotional argument is an equally emotional manifestation of feelings in the form of the stormy applause of the standing(!) deputies [ibid., p 26]. He is one of us and this

is what they are saying by this. He is not only one of us but is also a charismatic leader. From this viewpoint there is no surprise at all in the response of the audience to the statement by the Ukrainian deputy concerning the impoverished state of Ukrainian brothers under the domination of German occupiers. From the floor was heard, no more no less, "Comrade Trotsky! Support the Ukrainians." Aid was requested not from the Congress, not from the army, but personally from Comrade Trotsky. For the shouter, Trotsky was the personification of those forces of young Soviet power which were capable of such aid. In our view, such a shout precisely characterizes the "ego" or image of Trotsky created by the joint efforts of himself and his colleagues in the faction.

Also extremely informative is the **structure** of the speech. The ratio of the amounts of indisputable slogan statements which operate on the emotions of the audience, the reference to various authorities including the authority of the Congress and strict, logical proof of their theses provides an opportunity to judge the forms of effect on the psyche as activated by the given leader.

But, of course, it is far from just the forms of action on the psyche of the listeners that are of interest to a modern researcher, although they are very important as indicators of mass political conscience. What theses could be proven persuasively to the public by appealing to the emotional sphere, which by referring to authority and which required extensive proof—this is information, and a lot of it, which characterizes the development level of the psyche of the rank-and-file deputies and the subjects which are moving for them. But certainly something else is also important here. The leaders not only endeavored to "shape" mass political conscience. There was a most stubborn struggle underway at the Congress. The leaders showed themselves both in the forms and methods of this struggle.

The most important characteristics here are the **forms of response** to the accusations of opponents. It is not difficult to figure out that the responses with the activating of the different levels of the psyche—subconscious, conscious and self-conscious—will have a completely different sound, with a differing record in the text and, consequently, it is possible to detect these in the corresponding speeches. Thus, the response to the subconscious level was clearly demonstrated by Zinoviev in the quoted speech. Everything is wrong because a "good" man is accused by a "bad" or "other." In the same speech, the words of the Ukrainian representatives were described thus: "They spoke a communist speech, the same truly proletarian speech which we heard from the mouth of the leader, the old revolutionary, on behalf of the communists" [ibid.]. And here again we see an emotional characteristic with the corresponding qualifications of "communist," "true proletarian," "old revolutionary" and so forth reinforced by a reference to the leader's authority. The number of "proletarian" epithets per unit of area amazes the imagination.

Thus, the saturating of the text with direct qualifications is an indicator making it possible to measure the degree to which the speaker uses the first function. Ascertaining the theses of the studied leaders and their opponents and which were employed as the grounds for such qualifications represents the richest information concerning the unconditionally positive and negative stereotypes which existed among the congress participants. (Let us emphasize the difference between the stereotype and the standard. A stereotype is formed on the subconscious level and the standard on the conscious.) As for the second function, the indirect measurement of its activation can be the standard turns of phrase, references to authorities and which figure at least in certain speakers as the type "loyal Leninist" and so forth. Understandably, the immediate detection of the traces of the second function is significantly more labor intensive in comparison with the first and requires an analysis of the text using content analysis. At present, there even is the name "Soviet Speak" which is a specific slang in which even the slightest official papers "must be" written. As for the Fifth Congress which was analyzed by us, we were able to discover the following: "we are communists" and "we are the party of revolutionaries...." At first, someone finds a fortuitous phrase, it is picked up by the elite, everyone imitates it and the phrase grows wooden and is turned into a standard.

As we recall, during the so-called years of stagnation, the leaders did not endeavor to operate at all on the emotional aspect of the psyche of the listeners and the speeches were made on a level of rote phrases given as some bravura slogan. In contrast to the first period of party and Soviet history, when they sometimes responded simultaneously to the same phrase with both applause and shouts of "Disgrace!" later in the verbatim records one can uniformly predict the always unanimous response which actually occurred in the public in the auditorium. Thus, in recording references to unconditional standards which existed in the corresponding speeches and the response of those in the auditorium to these references—simply applause, stormy applause developing into an ovation—one can detect indisputable standards and rank them in the corresponding hierarchy.

Finally, the third function. In contrast to the first two, it can fully permit the existence of not "black" and not "white," but "spotted." Then the position of a person is not identified with the person himself. It is possible to disagree with so-and-so on some question, considering that the comrade is confused but generally speaking, he is a very convinced, principled and loyal to the revolution. He can be persuaded without employing strong-armed methods. The examples of such an approach to the question were demonstrated by V.I. Lenin. He participated in the political struggle, moreover he headed it, he did not agree with many on specific questions, however he did not identify a person with his viewpoint of the moment. In disagreeing with the leader of the leftist SRs, M. Spiridonova, he called her one of the sincerest persons dedicated to the cause of revolution and endeavored to eliminate the contradictions which existed

between them. What a difference with the response of Trotsky who from the very outset to the end defamed the leftist SRs in repetitive expressions! Thus, the indicators of the presence of the third function, as a factor of political struggle, can clearly be the complex, diverse dialectical characteristics of an event, phenomenon and a leader belonging to his own or opposing grouping.

Let us see how the situation stood for the third function at the Fifth Congress of Soviets. As has already been said, in the political leaders this should be strongly developed by definition. It is one thing, when a speaker examines the opponents theses from an unexpected aspect in order to defeat it more adroitly and regardless of their truthfulness and another when he uses the means of the third function for their constructive examination. Clearly, in the first instance he can successfully employ the arguments engendered by the first and second functions which often are more effective in the political game. In the second instance, his aim will not be the shaping of public opinion but rather the search for the truth in contact with colleagues, including those who adhere to the opposite opinion. Thus, the degree of utilizing the means of the third function is a fine indicator showing the presence or absence of the true evolution of an opinion in the process of discussion, that is, a real democratic discussion of the problem without the attaching of labels and with an attempt to examine the arguments of one's opponents in their essence, with a desire to understand their position, having drawn from it, if need be, the necessary conclusions. The question is posed of the methods of measuring this component of political struggle.

Of course, its only indicator is the developed logical line of argument of the theses proposed by the speaker. The attitude of the speaker to the opponent's arguments is also extremely indicative. Clearly it is possible to reply to the opponent on different levels.

There are effective procedures which make it possible to "bury" his speech without answering to the point. One could give several such examples. The first of these is that from the opponent's speech one picks up on a certain particular and demonstrates its discrepancy to reality. In this manner, one undermines the trust in the speaker on an emotional level. Such a demonstration can be made by the subconscious methods and by referring to the fact that this could not be because it could never be. Also effective are the means of the conscience, with reference to an accepted unconditional standard. Trotsky on the Leftist SRs: "But if they now tell us that this party is a leading detachment of the proletariat and the peasantry and the entire International, then we will move to the position of Kerenskiy, we, the communists; but I would still permit myself to say that the progressive proletariat is grouped around Petrograd and Moscow [ibid., p 32]. The author demonstrates that the words of Spiridonova contradict a standard recognized by all, that the communists cannot be viewed from the same position as Kerenskiy, by definition. Here he has logically developed the opponent's thesis in such a manner that he

has been able to draw from it the conclusion that the communists now hold the same positions which Kerenskiy previously held; then he showed the inadmissibility of the actual conclusion initially from the viewpoint of an unconditionally accepted standard and then on an emotional level: of course, the Bolsheviks could not consider themselves on the same level as Kerenskiy. As we see, in the given concrete instance, there are present the means of all three functions: with the logical development of the thesis the possibilities of the third function were undoubtedly employed; the second in the reference to the standard; the first in demonstrating the emotional inadmissibility of what was said.

Just what then does such an analysis provide aside from stating for the 1,000th time that here is one function, there another and that all three were used, although in different roles?

In our view, precisely the given example is a fine illustration of the reply to the given question. Yes, all three functions have been used, but how? The third function serves not to draw the constructive aspect from what was said by the opponent, no it is used for developing his theses toward an obvious absurd which can easily be disclosed, and performs a servicing role. Certainly each of the speakers himself chooses to which ideas of his opponents he will reply and which he will merely belittle. The use of the third function in the latter instance, of course, is merely a characteristic in the development of the critical function for the leader himself, making it possible for him to turn his rival's speech inside out, without at all being in the given context an indicator of his desire to resolve the problem, taking into account a viewpoint which differs from his own. Here it is clear that since the third function is only an auxiliary means making it possible to prove the position, having defended it from the feeble efforts of the opposing party, as significantly more accessible for the viewers, the opportunities of the other, base functions should be employed without fail.

However, in the materials of the same Fifth Congress, examples are also to be found of how Lenin attempted to analyze the speech by Spiridonova and show the absence of real insurmountable contradictions in the positions of the Bolsheviks and the Leftist SRs. Here the means of the third function are employed significantly more constructively than in the analyzed example. It can be concluded that one of the indicators of constructiveness can be an analysis of the opponent's ideas and not subordinate from its inception to the goal of demonstrating it in a false or unfailingly negative light.

Thus, in our opinion, first of all it is essential to record the subjects of the statements with a counting of the amount of text devoted to each of them and the corresponding speakers. Then, for each of the subjects, indications of a response from the floor should be recorded such as applause, laughter, the shouting of "Disgrace!" and so forth. When possible, that is, when there are indications in the text, the force of the reaction should

also be noted, for example, applause, stormy applause, ovation. In this manner, the sore points of the studied congress will be disclosed and particularly important are those when applause and shouts of "Disgrace!" are heard simultaneously. These are the disputed discussion questions of the Congress (for the Fifth Congress the following subjects have been established, in diminishing order: the food policy, the Brest Peace, the introduction of the death penalty, and the exclusion of representatives of the opposition parties, the Mensheviks and Rightist SRs, elected to the local soviets).

Undoubtedly, an interesting task is constructing a sociopsychological portrait of the speakers. The text of one speech serves as a unit of analysis in the proposed method. For constructing the portrait at our disposal are exactly as many units of research as there were speeches by the orator. In each of them we propose establishing the following parameters: the volumes of the texts dedicated to analyzing the speech of the previous orators and for one's own ideas; the ideas themselves; the functional means employed in the first and second instances, including taking to the absurd, irony, sarcasm, appealing to the emotional sphere of the listeners, reference to authorities and to standards, substituting a false thesis of the opponent; an analysis of the opponent's thesis initially with a minus sign and constructively with a previously undetermined or varying sign...; the number of direct qualifications, positive and negative, the relating of these to rivals or allies; the saturating of the text with indisputable slogans and other unconditional statements; the use by the author of a logical apparatus with the fixing of the goals of its employment for an analysis and for constructing on this basis constructive proposals, including from the rivals, or for showing proof of one's arguments with the recording of these arguments; for belittling the opponents' theses with an unconditional minus sign.

After carrying out this program, we will obtain a feature space with two types of descriptions. In the first place, there will be a description of each thesis heard at the congress. It will be clear what was the comparative acuteness of the polemics it caused with an indication of the involved persons and their contribution to the given polemics with an elucidation of the question of the psychological means of carrying out these polemics, including the irrelevance of the given question, its, if one can put it this way, academicness or, on the contrary, the implacability of the opponent positions with the inclusion of personal ambition. Secondly, for each active speaker a whole series of psychological portraits will be obtained for his various speeches. The reducing of these to a single whole will make it possible to gain a notion of the questions where the given orator was involved in discussion and his position. This involves the objective part of our characteristic. In addition to this, we will also obtain a subjective characteristic. First of all, these are the functional means comprising his arsenal, the ease of employing them, and the favorite means of political struggle: pressure on the emotional aspect of the psyche of the listeners with the appropriate references to authority,

normative-dogmatic accents or logical proofs. Clearly, in this manner as an indirect result we can assess the strength of each orator's position on the question raised by him, in using the following simple considerations. In the event of a firm mastery of the situation, a speaker would scarcely employ strong-armed means for affecting the psyche of the listeners. But the situation is completely changed if along with indisputable areas there are also dubious places in his position which have been disclosed by opponents. Then he will endeavor to distract attention from the contestable aspects which are actually difficult for him, in shifting the entire burden of his line of argument to winning, unconditional aspects for a maximally large number of those present. The level of the audience is also important. At times, it is possible to recognize the truth of the opponent if only because this would be perceived as an admission of defeat. One might ask how can these indisputably different cases be distinguished? In our opinion, this can be done rather simply on the basis of the proposed functional apparatus. In the first and third instances the means of the first and, possibly, the second functions will be employed; the third function can be called upon only as an auxiliary one for "twisting" the line of argument of the rival. In the second case, on the contrary, there will be an analysis of the opponent's position, that is, basically the third function should be employed as a logical analysis of the opponents position without the unconditional negation of it. The means of the first and second function, in the event they are present, will carry out only an ancillary role.

Thus, if initially we record all the questions heard at the congress, by describing the delivery of these questions by each orator, we will form a mass-like source, in the given instance, in the form of a matrix where a line represents a description of one speech of a leader in the categories defined by us. Each leader in a way answers the questions of a standard questionnaire, both objective, that is, with the listing of the outline of events, as well as the subjective which involve his opinions and the method of presenting the material and the effect on the listeners. Understandably, for each orator we will have both a summary representing his behavior as a whole at the congress, as well as a data file—a sheaf of such questionnaires filled out for each of his speeches—making it possible to trace the evolution of his position and forms of political behavior in the course of the struggle at the congress.

Understandably, a portion of the features, that is, individual characteristics of the studied speech, will have a quantitative nature including: the volume of the text devoted to a certain subject, the number of slogans and qualifications...but the basic portion by definition remains qualitative, including the characteristics of the given slogans and qualifications. The task arises of a comparative analysis of the mass-like source of such a complex nature and formed of various features. In the given situation, I propose employing frequency analysis

of the qualitative features [1], a method which has been specially developed by the author for a comparative analysis of diverse data and assuming their measurement on a general basis employing an understanding of the relationship, the comparison and so forth as this has intuitively come into being in historical science.

Let us begin by the nominal features. For instance, we have established the feature characterizing the slogans in the speaker's speech. The values of this can be the various specific slogans, for example, devoted to a certain individual subject. It is hard to say what slogan would be better or worse. Sometimes (not always) it can be said that one has evoked a greater response from the public but on the other hand it can always be said what speaker more frequently used a certain slogan at a given congress or what slogan on the basis of the frequency of its mentioning is the most popular at the studied moment among the congress deputies. Thus, as we propose, one can speak about the importance of the significance of the nominal feature (in the given case, a slogan) in the sense of the possibility of describing it with the aid of the studied aggregate. Certainly aggregates can vary: all the speeches given at the congress; all the speeches given by representatives of one party faction; all the speeches of one speaker.

Now, let us move on to the ranking features. For example, we are concerned for such a feature, for example, as the educational level of the deputies. Clearly, a 7th-grade education for a deputy at the Fifth Congress of Soviets and, for example, at the 28th CPSU Congress mean qualitatively different things. Important is not merely the significance of the ranking feature, but again its significance in the given aggregate of people. What do seven grades mean in 1918 and in our times? Clearly this depends upon the relative number of persons who have the same or less education. The more there are in the total number, the more significant this education; the less there are, on the contrary, the less significant. Thus, the value of the importance of the ranking feature is measured by the cumulative probability and in case of a sample, by the cumulative frequency of encountering such a value of the ranking feature in our aggregate.

Finally, there are the quantitative features. Clearly in our "questionnaire" there are rather many of them, for example, the volumes of text devoted to one or another question. The given quantity, however, is only an expression of a certain content and in and of itself does not represent value. In actuality it is clear that the amount of a speech devoted to a certain slogan, as a rule, will be significantly less than the amount devoted to a certain proof of a thesis which is calmly and thoroughly exposed to the fire of criticism, doubt and reflection. On the basis of this, is it possible to assert the lesser significance of the former for the author and the listeners than the latter? Possibly, the speaker is intentionally focusing attention on the latter, in avoiding a question and then later achieves his goal using an abandoned slogan? Furthermore, from the number of words, how is it possible to gain any judgment, for example, of the comparative

effectiveness of the various slogans and arguments? Clearly in the case of quantitative features which conceal a certain content behind their meanings, the meaning itself may not mean anything, but rather it is important here to measure not the meaning but rather the importance of it in our aggregate. And here, as in the previous cases of the nominal and ranking features, the importance is measured by the frequency of the same or lesser amount among the other quantities of the same category. Thus, the terseness of a slogan can be judged from how frequently the terser or the same such slogans are encountered in the speeches of the deputies, the deputies of a given faction and an individual deputy. It is also possible to judge accurately of the distribution of them in the volume of judgment, in comparing all the judgments, having counted the number of judgments which are shorter or the same. Thus, the significance of the meaning of the quantitative features, as in the case of a ranking feature, is calculated through a total or cumulative. And in the case where the quantitative feature is continuous, then by using a Lebesgue integral.

As a result of such a measurement of different features in a unified value scale, the employment of mathematical statistics becomes correct [3, 4]. As is known, the results of employing statistical methods vary and are rather difficult to interpret. Often one chooses the most plausibly interpreted result out of a multiplicity of statistically the same likelihoods thereby "favoring" the already existing viewpoint. For eliminating the given shortcoming, I propose employing a procedure of constructing and testing hypotheses [4].

I have endeavored briefly to provide a notion of the possibility of a historical sociological approach to an analysis of party and Soviet documents. This approach assumes the formalizing of the texts of the speeches of speakers who were heard at one or another forum. The texts formalized as standard questionnaires are analyzed by using mathematical methods. The task is set of studying the averaged structural cause-and-effect ties between the established features. We propose that the demonstrated approach is applicable not only for studying the verbatim records of the congresses. With its aid it is possible to examine any texts used in political activity. Of course, for each type of text, the method should be modified in the required manner. For example, in studying decrees and official acts, in the forefront should be such indicators as the noncontradictoriness of the given decree to the already existing system of legislative enactments, the time which has lapsed since the adoption of the last decree on the given question, the phraseological or semantic modernization, the party affiliation of the decree authors and so forth, and so forth. As we see, the list of questions which can easily be changed with a change in the object and source of research makes it possible to modify the method without particular difficulty. It is important that the apparatus for studying the secondary source formed by us be unified as this makes it possible to analyze the structure of our data of a nonnumerical nature outside the dependence upon the existing specific features. Moreover, with

its aid we are able to have a complete comparison of documents which are completely incomparable under ordinary conditions both in terms of the questions touched on in them as well as in terms of the questions discussed in establishing the mechanisms and forms of relationship with the group of interests and in using the apparatus of the above-mentioned three functions. The merits and limitations of the proposed approach will be shown by time and by the ongoing work on the hundreds and thousands of preserved documents.

Let us briefly present the tentative results of an analysis of the verbatim record. First by counting the applause we establish the sore points, the subjects which evoke emotions.

It might be expected that the communist Sverdlov, the Englishman Feinberg, Sosnovskiy, Trotskiy and Lashevich who were the first to speak to a certain degree set the tone. For what reason were they applauded? Sverdlov received applause once when he named the number of communist mandates (the faction in terms of size was double that of the Leftist SRs), Feinberg was applauded six times, including three times stormily, when he spoke about Russia as sacred for the proletariat and described the SRs as endeavoring to take away the power won by the workers. The remainder involved praise for the communists (twice) and the justification of the struggle as an attribute of the revolution. It was possible to give blessings on behalf of the international proletariat as all means were good in the struggle for the communist ideal.

Sosnovskiy won stormy applause, having identified the Leftist SRs with the Rightist SRs and the Mensheviks. Trotskiy gained stormy applause from the delegates for qualifying the congress as the superior body of revolutionary power and where he was a simple soldier.

As we can see, from the response of the audience, two subjects are clearly apparent. The first we can conditionally call praise for the communists, the only true revolutionaries. The second was well put by Lashevich in the words "we challenge you (the Leftist SRs.—L.B.) to battle" which incidentally also garnered applause. Both are components of a single whole: we "the good" challenge you "the bad" to battle through the congress, where we are the majority and are its soldiers. Thus, one can speak of the mind set of the Bolshevik faction for confrontation.

Let us see what the response was from the faction of the Leftist SRs to the speeches of the main speakers: Kamkov, Spiridonova and Karelin. Kamkov was applauded six times and all were related to insinuations against German capitalism: four times for indirectly accusing the Bolsheviks of serving Mirbach, and twice for support of the Ukrainians. Spiridonova also received applause six times. She declared the accepting of the challenge to combat and without chances for victory at the congress due to the communist majority at it, but not in the nation. Kamkov received applause for describing the Bolsheviks as lackeys of German imperialism and as counterrevolutionaries. As we can see, the basic leit motiv among the Leftist SRs was a presentiment of the fierce struggle of the Bolsheviks against them

and that they would be expelled from the soviets as had been done with the Rightist SRs and Mensheviks. The question arises of just how embittered they were with the Bolsheviks. Let us examine the corresponding qualifications. All disapproval, often quite fierce, was related to certain acts of the Bolsheviks. For Kamkov the most dangerous was the Brest Peace which he described as toadying to the Germans. For Spiridonova it was the peasant question and namely the question of the food dictatorship [5].

For the Bolsheviks the situation was fundamentally the opposite. Undoubtedly, they were the attacking side. The Leftist SRs were on the defensive and the means for struggle was the Peasant Congress and the search for support outside the congress, in the nation, where they were profoundly convinced that they were in the majority.

In order to understand the difference in the views of the Bolsheviks and the Leftist SRs, let us again turn to psychological theory. It is a generally accepted fact of psychology that there are two incomparable levels of a person's rejection: on the level of actions and as such. In the first instance, it is criticism on the level of the conscience: a person is not hopeless, he can be "rehabilitated" and there is no negative view of him. In the second instance there is no criticism, but there is the rejection on the level of the subconscious, and any action by him is interpreted in a biased manner, for the entire being of the condemning person, due to the presence of a negative mind set, is directed at this.

The Leftist SRs repeatedly emphasized their closeness to the Bolsheviks, referring to what they had experienced together and the common history of their struggle, and in truth such passages were not awarded with applause. But equally clear is their desire to collaborate with the Bolsheviks if the latter "mended their ways." The negative qualifications apply not to the Bolsheviks themselves but rather to the actions which made them the "lackeys of Mirbach" and put them on a path of confrontation with the peasantry. There was no negative mind set to the perception of the Bolsheviks.

But the Bolsheviks in the persons of Trotskiy, Sosnovskiy, Lashevich and Zinovyev, were significantly harsher. There was no question at all of any deeds by the Leftist SRs but rather they themselves. By repeated applause for Trotskiy's words about a party of neurasthenics and hysterics and a clutch of intellectuals, the Bolshevik faction demonstrated their rejection of the Leftist SRs on the level of a mind set. Zinovyev slandered this party, comparing it to a courtyard with a through passage and for this he was also awarded with applause (twice). Only Lenin refrained from unflattering qualifications of the party as such due to its membership, speaking about the sincere people and that they were confused and had lost their head.

In the first instance, the criticism can give rise to a negative mind set and in the second instance often criticism is the consequence of a negative mind set. In the confrontation of the Bolsheviks with the Leftist SRs, as we see, it was a matter of the second case and for the Leftist SRs with the Bolsheviks, rather the first. In Lenin (the only one of the Bolsheviks) no negative mind set can be fixed. Against the background of the rejection of the party was sympathy for the people. But, in speaking about a party "which has brought its sincerest representatives to a place where they have fallen into this morass of lie and deception," he concluded that "such a party is a dead party." And he asserted that there was no disagreement between the Leftist SRs and the Bolsheviks as Spiridonova felt, "no, this is not a disagreement, this is an actual, **irrevocable** (emphasis mine.—L.B.) rupture..." [2]. And Lenin says this in being comparatively gentle toward the party representatives. But Zinov'ev who was applauded almost incessantly (17 times), won virtually all applause for unflattering responses and polemics with the Leftist SRs.

The communists by definition were the only party worthy of Marxism and the Russian revolution.

Such an aggressive mind set which was formed on the emotional subconscious level and inherent to all the Bolshevik leaders with the exception, perhaps, of Lenin leads one to the notion that it would take only the slightest spark to unleash the flames of interparty struggle aimed at destroying the supporters of the opposing party and with which there were no common memories and no uniting feature; there was only revolution almost on a physiological level for they were hysterics and neurasthenics. Indicative is the joy which Trotsky spoke after the notorious revolt [Kronshtadt] of his rightness in assessing the defeated party.

In light of the given analysis is it not worth raising the question of a critical examination of the real importance of the events which have gone down in history as the revolt of the Leftist SRs all the more as here there was involved such a curious figure as the well-known Blyumkin? We will conclude the preliminary analysis with this question, having promised to continue to construct the sociopsychological portraits of individual authors.

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Echo of the Afghan War

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[Article by Valentin Gennadyevich Nemirovskiy, candidate of philosophical sciences and docent at the Krasnoyarsk State University. Our journal has published his following works: "The Image of the Desired Future as a Factor in Forming the Sociovocational Guidance of Juveniles" (No 2, 1984), "Almost a Fantasy" (co-author, No 4, 1987) and "The Attitude of Youth Toward Foreign Ideological Trends" (No 4, 1989)]

[Text] In 1989, the Sociological Laboratory of Krasnoyarsk State University conducted a questionnaire poll of 320 Afghan veterans. According to the data obtained, over 70 percent of those questioned had spent from a year to two years in Afghanistan, 13 percent had been there from six months to a year, and nine percent less than six months. A majority of them, some 75 percent, had not been wounded, 21 percent had been wounded once, and four percent repeatedly. Among those questioned eight percent were disabled.

According to their social origin, three-fourths were from worker and kolkhoz member families and the remainder were children of specialists in different spheres of activity. As a rough approximation this corresponds to the social structure of the city's population. Additional research would be needed to ascertain whether the youth were recruited equally from all social strata for Afghanistan. However, even now one is struck by the virtual absence in the sampling of children of servicemen and workers of law enforcement bodies as well as various leading workers.

A majority of those in the sampling had a secondary education—51 percent, a specialized secondary—25 percent, and a higher education—four percent, 15 percent of the veterans were studying in VUZes, and five percent had not yet received a secondary education. Over one-half of them were Komsomol members, one-third non-party persons, and 15 percent candidate members and

members of the CPSU. Two-thirds of those questioned were married and one-half had children.

The research was viewed as the first stage of a long-term study and encompassed a series of various problems of which the article presented three groups of questions: an assessment by the veterans of the Afghan War and their participation in it, the impact which this war had on the spiritual make-up of the Afghan veterans and, finally, their social activeness and political orientation.

The War In the Eyes of Veterans

An overwhelming majority of those questioned supported the decision of the Soviet government to withdraw our forces from Afghanistan. Only five percent at the moment of the poll assumed that this decision was premature. A majority (two thirds) of the Afghan veterans felt that the decision should have been taken long before. Approximately one fifth called this decision timely.

In human terms it is completely understandable that the veterans wounded in Afghanistan more actively support the government's decision to withdraw the troops from this country than those who were not wounded. Conversely, those married and with children somewhat more frequently considered this decision premature and this was obviously explained by the greater conservatism of family persons.

Opinions on the truthfulness of the press in treating the Afghan events were split and around 40 percent assumed that everything written was not the truth or, at least, the press substantially distorted events. All the remainder, a majority, viewed the treatment of the events in Afghanistan by the press, particularly recently, as completely truthful.

A majority of the young veterans positively viewed the activities of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA]. Thus, around nine percent agreed that this was a progressive revolutionary party which was leading the masses along a path to democratic changes. In the opinion of 42 percent, this was a party which undoubtedly had committed definite political errors but a majority of the people supported it. Some 46 percent replied that the PDPA clearly had overestimated its influence on the people of Afghanistan, it had not been supported in the masses but now was endeavoring to alter the situation which had arisen. Only three percent viewed it as a party completely divorced from the people and acting separately. As we can see, as a whole, a positive critical view of the role of the PDPA prevailed.

A majority supported the policy of national reconciliation; only four percent of the respondents saw in this a humiliating and unnecessary compromise with the forces of reaction. One-half of those questioned felt that this was the only reliable way to improve the domestic political situation and raise the authority of the PDPA.

The remaining 45 percent supported a pragmatic position. In their opinion, the policy of national reconciliation was of course conciliation with the counterrevolution but at the same time an attempt to improve the existing political situation.

A majority of those questioned responded positively to the local population (43 percent as a whole good and 27 percent satisfactory). Some 21 percent voiced a clearly negative opinion of the local population. And the remaining 9 percent replied that they considered different people differently or did not voice a uniform opinion.

What do the "new veterans" think about the committing of Soviet troops to Afghanistan which marked the beginning to a decade of bloodshed? The most widespread opinion among those questioned was that "although the introduction of Soviet troops is a complicated question, the Soviet military, without doubt, provided help to the Afghan people" (60 percent of those polled). One-third of the young persons felt that this was a tragic political error. And only seven percent unconditionally support it as "this was a prompt and correct decision by the Soviet government since the Soviet troops helped defend the victories of the April Revolution." Thus, the "hawks" are a clear minority among the former internationalist soldiers while "doves" are encountered significantly more often. However, a majority, although with certain stipulations, justifies this action. Here one can see a clear tendency: the higher the educational level of the veterans the more frequently they supported the opinion that the introduction of troops into Afghanistan was a tragic political error.

There is a certain paradox here: a majority of people in the various nations of the world and who fought at one time in some place, regardless of all the terrors and hardships, considered this period the best time of their lives. A similar trend was apparent among our respondents as 62 percent responded affirmatively to the question "Would you like to go back to Afghanistan?" and 38 percent negatively. Here those who do not consider the introduction of troops into Afghanistan to be a tragic political mistake are the first to experience nostalgia for their military past.

Many fine words have been written about soldier friendship and comradely relations which in the literal sense were reinforced by blood and sweat. However, only one-third of those questioned regularly correspond or meet with their comrades. As a whole, the young veterans rarely maintain ties with their combat comrades (60 percent) or do not maintain this at all (six percent). What is the reason for this: in the rush and tension of modern life or a reticence to stir up difficult memories? Possibly it is something else? Unfortunately, at the given stage our research does not provide an answer to this question.

From the conversations published in the press with former Afghan veterans and from their comments over

the radio and television, one can often hear that proper relations were maintained among the military in Afghanistan. And the Krasnoyarsk veterans seemingly confirmed this opinion, in speaking about the unusually close and particularly trusting interpersonal relations. Nevertheless, 80 percent of those questioned stated that in Afghanistan they had encountered manifestations of improper relations and another 10 percent had not encountered these themselves but knew about such cases. Some one-fifth of those questioned felt that these relations in their way were beneficial as they formed real men and helped maintain discipline in the army. Almost one-half (48 percent) viewed the improper relations as an unpleasant phenomenon which, however, helped maintain discipline in the army. Only one-third of the Afghan veterans felt that the improper relations were an evil which had to be decisively eradicated.

As is known, hundreds of our soldiers and officers during combat in Afghanistan were taken prisoner by the enemy. Up to the present, more than 300 persons are officially listed as missing in action. What do their former fellow servicemen think about this? One-half of those questioned sympathized with them feeling that they must be aided in every possible way in returning home. One-third of those questioned justified their attitude toward our prisoners of war by the circumstances under which they were captured. Some 13 percent voiced a negative attitude toward them while four percent of the young veterans were unable to state their opinion.

As we can see, although the young veterans view the Afghan war and their involvement in it in a rather contradictory manner, self-justification prevails in their words. In avoiding extreme viewpoints, the opinion of a majority can be expressed in the following manner: we provided definite aid to the Afghan government but the troops should have been withdrawn sooner.

Heroes or Victims?

Involvement in combat could not help but tell on the spiritual world of the young persons.¹ Certainly any war, even the most just, and which cannot be said of the Afghan war, has a strong psychotraumatizing effect. Nevertheless, more than one-half of those questioned

stated that Afghanistan had changed them for the better. One-fourth said both for the better and for the worse. Some 14 percent assumed that Afghanistan did not change them. And only 6 percent replied that Afghanistan influenced them for the worse. Thus, how precisely were these changes reflected?

According to the results of content analysis of the replies by the veterans, involvement in the Afghan campaign basically had a positive influence on them. Thus, according to the opinion of one-third of those polled, Afghanistan taught them to value and understand others, life, friendship, the motherland and themselves. In the opinion of one-fourth of the veterans, they became more independent, strong-willed, self-disciplined, they gained confidence in themselves, a goal in life, they matured and became adult. Similar to these answers is the opinion of another 18 percent of those polled who write about a complete change in their attitude toward life. One-tenth of the veterans assumed that the war in Afghanistan had taught them justice and implacability toward evil. Only 14 percent wrote about the negative effect of combat saying they had become nervous, harsh and cruel and it was more difficult to deal with others around.

On the basis of the quoted data, the conclusion can be drawn on the beneficial effect of military operations on the spiritual and moral development of a young man. However, in our view, this would be unjustifiably hurried. Certainly any war, even a war of liberation, involves the violating of the higher moral value, the value of the life of another person. Can one then speak about the war from the outset as criminal and absurd, when a majority of the local inhabitants viewed the internationalist soldiers as foreign invaders!

We feel that the upbeat coloring to the answers of a majority of the Afghan veterans has been caused by the effect of mechanisms of psychological defense when negative events are "forgotten." Here a definite role is also played by the specific features of the combat situation with its psychological saturation and moral-goal certainty: it is no accident that many participants of the Great Patriotic War considered this the best time of their lives.

The attitude of the young men to their involvement in the Afghan campaign was assessed using four parameters: emotional, moral, practical and temporal. For each of these positive views prevailed (see Table 1).

Table 1: Attitude of Afghan Veterans to Their Stay in Afghanistan, %

Judgments	Agree Fully	Agree Partially	Disagree
Emotional:			
Time spent in Afghanistan was happiest time in my life	10	42	48
Afghanistan was the most difficult and joyless time in my life	7	29	64
Moral:			
I am proud I served in Afghanistan	58	26	16
I am ashamed that I was involved in this war	3	12	85

Table 1: Attitude of Afghan Veterans to Their Stay in Afghanistan, % (Continued)

Judgments	Agree Fully	Agree Partially	Disagree
Practical:			
Only in Afghanistan did I feel my necessity and irreplaceability	25	43	32
I felt myself superfluous there	5	14	81
Future:			
I will never forget Afghanistan	96	3	31
I do not want to recall all that happened there	13	29	58

As is shown in the table, the highest are the future assessments which express the temporal aspect of the attitude in that a predominant majority of those questioned will never be able to forget Afghanistan, even if some of them do not want to recall what happened there. In second place are the moral assessments and namely the pride for participation in the Afghan War, with more than one-half of those questioned unconditionally experiencing this feeling. Lower were the practical assessments. The meagerest were the emotional assessments and only one-tenth of the Krasnoyarsk Afghan veterans that the time spent in this southern nation was the "happiest time" in my life.

The eight indicators used by us for the attitude of the veterans to the war in Afghanistan form two complexes, one of which describes a positive attitude toward it and the other a negative one. The first includes the successively interrelated awareness of their need in Afghanistan, the assessment of the time spent there as the happiest period of their life and pride for the fact that they served in Afghanistan. The second complex of descriptions for the attitude toward the war is a sort of "star" the center of which is the judgment: "Afghanistan was the hardest and most joyless time in my life." Linked to this are a feeling of shame for participation in this war, an awareness that he was superfluous there and, finally, a reticence to recall the events which happened then. These two complexes of ideas—positive and negative—are linked together by the judgment "I will never be able to forget Afghanistan." This yet again shows that at present everything that happened close to our southern frontiers, both the heroic and the tragic, the base and the loathsome is already separated from us by the river of time. It remains real for the participants of those events only due to human memory.

Initially, the hypothesis was advanced by us that the morally positive attitude toward the war in Afghanistan (the indicator "I am proud of serving in Afghanistan") was caused primarily by massed and ideological action. This hypothesis was confirmed in the research results. As a rule, those who spent a comparatively short time of under six months there are proud of their involvement in the war. Significantly more critical of it are the fellows who were on Afghan land, as they say, "from the entire round," and who had their fill of the "military romance"

and rather profoundly felt a "feeling of performed international duty." This feeling was rarely felt by those veterans who due to their higher cultural and educational level (a higher or incomplete higher education) were inclined to be critical of the imposed ideological stereotypes and social myths.

The emotional aspect of assessing involvement in the Afghan War also to a certain degree was subjected to the influence of ideology. In particular, members of the CPSU and the Komsomol more often term this period the happiest time in their lives. The wounded and disabled upheld this opinion significantly more rarely than did those who had the good fortune of remaining uninjured.

In speaking about the practical and future aspects of the assessment of participation in combat, we would point out that the disabled more rarely admit their necessity there but more often recollect about Afghanistan. Also considering themselves superfluous were those who spent in Afghanistan a comparatively short time of less than a year (obviously, this is explained by the incomplete process of adaptation to combat) and by those who have children. This is also characteristic for young persons who fought in Afghanistan during the last years of the longest war which the Soviet Union has waged, when the attitude of society toward it became significantly more critical than at the beginning of the 1980s.

A very indicative picture emerged: related to the several-score indicators of the social mind sets and orientations recorded in the research were only those indicators of assessing involvement in the war in Afghanistan which express a negative attitude toward it. The indicators of a positive attitude (pride, good fortune, a sensation of one's necessity and irreplaceability) correlate only with other indicators of the assessment and also the indicators of certain social characteristics such as age, educational level, party affiliation, and time spent in Afghanistan. From this it follows that the positive assessments of their involvement in the war were assimilated by many veterans only on a verbal level, under the influence of propaganda and under the effect of the mechanisms of psychological defense.

There is the opinion that participation in the Afghan War became for the young persons involved in it a real school of patriotism. The data obtained by us force us to doubt this.

Patriotism is an exceptionally complex spiritual formation which allows a differing interpretation. In accord with our tasks, two indicators were employed: notions about the motives of the soldier's participation in combat and his orientation to the method of defending the motherland in a military situation. For an analysis of the former, the respondents were given a hypothetical question: "Soldiers fighting on the front are guided by different feelings. What do you think if a military situation were to arise, what would your contemporary in battle think about and what would he experience?" Then they were offered to judge using a three-point scale ten possible motives of conduct. For measuring the second indicator, the following question was used also of a hypothetical sort: "The defense of the motherland is an honorable duty for each person. But the motherland can be defended in different ways. Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, one young person, let us call him Vladimir, volunteered for the front. A second, Sergey, continued studying in the institute until he received his notification from the military commissariat, a third, Andrey, worked hard at a defense plant during the entire war. A fourth, Viktor, during the entire war studied in an institute, he subsequently became a good specialist and employed his knowledge in rebuilding the economy. In the place of which of these could you bring the greater benefit?" As the readers will clearly notice, the wording of the question emphasized the high social significance of each variation of conduct. Understandably, this was done in the aim to a certain degree of compensating for the influence of the social standards which actively propagandize volunteering and self-sacrifice.

As a "control" group for our experiment, we used 3,000 students from the senior years of the VUZes of Krasnoyarsk and they were polled by sociologists from Krasnoyarsk State University in 1983, that is, at the very peak of the Afghan story. In the given instance, the replies from the students are indicative considering two circumstances. In the first place, they are the most highly educated part of the youth and their mind directly reflected both the stereotypes of the conscience of their age cohort as well as the results of massed ideological action. No other category of the youth has been exposed to such intense ideological influence, with the exception, perhaps, of schoolchildren. However, the latter still do not possess sufficient social experience and psychological maturity to consciously judge the questions of interest to us. Secondly, none of them had participated in military operations.

A readiness to volunteer for the front is equally inherent both to the veterans and to the students as three-fourths of the representatives in each group expressed an intention to follow the example of Vladimir. At the same time, 30-40 percent of the future specialists, along with a readiness to volunteer for the front, noted other variations of behavior, identifying with Sergey, Andrey or Viktor [1, pp 163-165]. Among the Afghan veterans desiring to follow the example of Sergey, Andrey or Viktor, there were, respectively, 10 percent, five percent and three percent.

Thus, the Afghan veterans more actively express a readiness to volunteer for the front than did the students who had not participated in combat. But these views also depend upon their attitude toward the Afghan War: the more negatively a veteran views his participation in it, the lower the probability that he would choose the intention of following the example of Vladimir, that is, volunteer for the front.

Very indicative is the structure of notions of the veterans concerning the motives of conduct in combat as expressed by a maximum correlation graph. The latter is a correlation star in the center of which is the motive "protection of one's children." We feel that such a structure is already rationalized, for in a period of involvement in combat operations a predominant majority of our respondents was still not married and did not have children.

There is a definite correlation between the answers to the given hypothetical question and an assessment of their own involvement in the Afghan War. In particular, the young people who considered their stay in Afghanistan as the hardest and unhappiest time in their life assume more rarely than others that their contemporary in combat will defend his future and the party. Those who are reticent to recall what happened in this "longest war" are not inclined to point out motives such as defense of relatives, the home city, settlement, the carrying out of orders and a desire to destroy the enemy.

Following the results of factor analysis, four types of motivation for the behavior of soldiers in combat were established. The first factor describes social motives (protection of relatives, children, friends, the city or settlement), but rejects personality ones (protection of one's life, one's conviction, or one's future), ideological (defense of the party), patriotic (defense of the motherland) and aggressive (a desire to destroy the enemy). The second characterizes the personality motives but denies the social and aggressive. The third expresses the aggressive motive and rejects disciplinary (carrying out orders), the patriotic and the ideological. The fourth describes the ideological and patriotic motives in denying the social and personality.

In terms of significance for the veterans, the motives can be ranked as follows: 1) patriotic; 2) aggressive; 3) disciplinary; 4) social; 5) personality; 6) ideological. For the VUZ students polled 7 years ago, a completely different picture was observed. For them in first place there was a challenge between the ideological and patriotic motives, social ones were in third place, personality in fourth, then came disciplinary with aggressive completing the ranking. There was a sharp discrepancy in the idealized notions of war formed under peacetime conditions and those judgments which arose under the conditions of a combat situation. Nevertheless, the motive of patriotism both among the students and the veterans holds a leading place in the hierarchy of judgments. Such a coinciding among both leads one to the notion that this is an unique sociocultural phenomenon which plays an

important role in the action of the mechanisms of psychological defense. Also arguing in favor of such an assumption is the fact that in both groups it shows the least variation. Incidentally, among the veterans the ideological motive has the greatest variation and among the students the aggressive. Thus, under the influence of combat there are significant changes in the notions concerning motivation and conduct in combat. Its core, the social and personality motives, remain unchanged. However, the desire to defend the party changes places with the desire to destroy the enemy. It would be naive to speak about a uniformly positive influence of involvement in real combat on shaping the feeling of patriotism in the youth. Much here depends upon the self-awareness of a person and upon the depth to which he has analyzed the events occurring there. It is no accident that only a small portion of the veterans takes an active part in the patriotic education of juveniles and many of them in one way or another endeavor to avoid any social activeness.

The index for overall satisfaction with life among the Afghan veterans does not differ from the given indicator in the other youth categories. At the same time, there is substantially lower satisfaction with the socioeconomic aspects of life: housing and domestic conditions, the supply of food and industrial goods, the cultural development of a city, and their own material situation. However, as a whole, satisfaction with interpersonal relations is higher, including: relations with parents, with one's wife, with comrades on the job and in study. The differences in the other indicators of satisfaction are statistically insignificant. As we see, the Afghan veterans were right that participation in military operations taught them to understand others better. It is no accident that the trend was disclosed: the longer time a young person spent in Afghanistan the more he was satisfied with his relations with his wife and the possibility of realizing his plans.

As might be expected, the wounded and disabled were least satisfied with various aspects of their life. An exception is the supply of food and industrial goods as the wounded and disabled, as a rule, receive various "packages." And in addition, relations with one's wife who clearly often becomes the chief support in the life of a former internationalist soldier. However, frequently family relations do not withstand the testing by the routine of everyday life as respondents with children are less satisfied with relations with their better half than are those who live still without children.

The attitude toward life, as is known, is inseparably linked with an attitude toward death. As a result of content analysis of the replies by various groups of respondents to the questions in the course of formalized interviews, five characteristic notions about immortality were established and the indicators of these were incorporated into the instrumentarium of a series of research studies, including in the questionnaire polling of the former Afghan veterans. These are: sociocreative "after death a person continues to live in his deeds as long as others remember him," sociodemographic "after death a

person continues to live in his children and grandchildren," theological "after death only a person's body disappears but his soul in one form or another continues to exist independently," and hedonistic "after death there will be nothing and for this reason one must get from life everything that one can." Research has shown that orientation to sociocreative immortality among the former Afghan soldiers was somewhat higher than, for example, among the graduates of secondary schools, PTU [vocational-technical school], technical schools and VUZ students, with respectively 96 percent and 86 percent of those questioned expressing to one degree or another agreement with the given judgment. Conversely, the hedonistic orientations were weaker: respectively, 69 percent and 79 percent. Sociodemographic and theological immortality is of the same importance for them: respectively, 89 percent and 96 percent, and somewhat weaker are the hedonistic and sociodemographic orientations: respectively, 69 percent and 79 percent, 89 percent and 96 percent. Theological immortality is of the same significance for them.

The attitude toward a theological concept is linked differently to party affiliation and age of those polled. With party member, as a rule, rejecting this while older respondents, on the contrary, more frequently prefer it. We consider that here one feels, on the one hand, imbedded ideological stereotypes and, on the other, experience in life and reflection on the sense of life.

The notion of theological immortality is also linked to a negative attitude toward the war in Afghanistan. Believing in the immortality of the soul are primarily those veterans who considered themselves superfluous there, who did not want to recall that time, who were ashamed of their involvement in the Afghan War and considered that the time spent there was the hardest and unhappiest in their life. For some of them the sensation of tragicness and the absurdity of the events which occurred there and an awareness of the ease with which one could deprive any person of his life led to a desire to gain from life all that was possible, that is, hedonistic orientation. Characteristically, the sociocreative and sociodemographic attitude toward death are not linked either to an assessment of the Afghan events or to indicators of the respondent's social status. For this reason, it can be assumed that they are often assimilated only on a verbal level without involving the motivational system of the young persons.

Thus, to the question given in the title of this section one must answer affirmatively. Yes, they are victims because they died and suffered in a senseless war unleashed by criminal leadership. "Any destruction and particularly murder is contrary to human nature itself and for this reason it is particularly painful even if it is committed under the conditions of a war," said Pitirim, the Metropolitan of Volokolamsk and Yuryev. And, finally, the spiritual traumas which the war brings are so diverse and so socially broad that absolutely everyone suffers from them. Even if a soldier has returned from their bold, courageous and physically strong, whatever he might say about this, he still has

been spiritually traumatized [1, pp 8-11]. Yes, they are heroes because they carried out their duty.

However, it must be self-critically recognized that the materials obtained by us do not provide an answer to another equally important question of "can an active participant in a criminal war be a hero?" Until recently this was often perceived as a rhetorical question, for everyone knows the conclusion of the Nuremberg Trial: "the execution of a criminal order does not free one from the responsibility of the crime." But here an official view of the Afghan War has been given and this question has moved into the practical plane. It is the veterans who first of all must answer.

Radicals or Conservatives?

The research has shown that the Afghan veterans view the state of our society more critically than do the other categories of modern youth. Only one percent (among the student youth, six percent) feels that "in our society everything is good and nothing need be changed." Some 13 percent of the Afghan veterans feel that "in our society there are certain problems which demand a solution" [50 percent], while 86 percent feel "our society requires a fundamental improvement and change" (44 percent). They participate somewhat more actively in perestroika: 20 percent, while among the student youth such a view was checked by half this amount, 11 percent. Nevertheless, a majority, in their words, do not take any real part in improving society: for 23 percent "because I do not know what must be done for this" (among the students 45 percent) and 57 percent "because nothing really depends upon me" (44 percent).

However, regardless of the obstacles to its realization, virtually each man had a definite social ideal. This is an aggregate of higher social values. In working out the instrumentarium we have relied on the work of V.N. Shilov [2].²

Among the Krasnoyarsk Afghan veterans, the most significant was "security" which included the demand of maintaining peace and preserving a healthy environment. "Labor," "collectivism" and "humanism" possess high importance. At the same time, least important is "social justice" which in the questionnaire was interpreted as establishing an order whereby the well-being of a person would be determined solely by his personal qualities and accomplishments; one-fourth of those questioned considered this demand on social life to be "unimportant."

Among the last in terms of importance were "democracy" (the involvement of each citizen in the governing of society), "dignity," "liberty" as the providing of equal opportunities for achieving success in life as well as "equality" and "prosperity."

It must be said that the structure of higher sociopolitical values among the veterans as a whole corresponds to the structure disclosed among the student youth and this is also confirmed by the results of factor analysis. However,

the Afghan veterans as a whole are significantly more demanding on society and the importance of all values is somewhat higher for them.

Characteristically, among the CPSU members one more often encounters conservatives than among the nonparty persons or Komsomol members. For the conservatives more significant are the values expressing demands for maintaining a stable social system (protecting the environment, maintaining peace, collectivism and labor) and not for the development of this system.

Thus, in the mass conscience of former Afghan veterans as, incidentally, among the other youth categories, the value system exists not as a single whole but in the form of a number of contradictory and at times mutually exclusive values. Each of the isolated orientations represents, as it were, a contradictory copy of several fragments of the socialist social ideal. And it often assumes the form of a mass deindividualized society. A society which is constantly developing, in which reign peace and order, everything is done for the good of man, the people, as a rule, are poor and help one another, each person works and has an opportunity for all-round development. However, is it possible to establish such a society on the principles of collectivism and humanism (and to which a majority of those questioned is oriented) without democracy and social justice, without freedom and respect for the dignity of each person? The tragic experience of our nation, like a number of other countries which followed the infectious example of building "the most just society," convincingly bespeaks the reverse.

Thus, we have established how the veterans see the restructured society. Logically the question arises in what manner do they intend to restructure it?

The answers of the young persons to the so-called "hypothetical question" of "as you know, in many nations of the world your contemporaries are working actively for social progress. What, in your opinion, forms of action are most effective?" make it possible to draw definite conclusions on the acceptable and unacceptable methods in the struggle to restructure society. The use of factor analysis has shown that a broad campaign in the press, strikes (the refusal to study), and massed armed struggle represent independent, often mutually exclusive, views concerning the method of action in extremely political situations. In essence, these are three consecutive levels in the development of political struggle. Correspondingly, there are three categories of young persons who consider one or another form of action as the most effective. Let us call them arbitrarily "propagandists," "strikers" and "fighters." Characteristically, a majority of the veterans does not view participation in demonstrations as an independent form of political struggle and both the "propagandists" as well as the "strikers" or "fighters" consider it possible to resort to this.

The reader would certainly be interested in the question of which of the established groups is most widely represented among the veterans? In first place are the "strikers," then the "fighters" with the "propagandists" a significant distance behind them.

It must be emphasized that none of those questioned pointed to such methods of political struggle as underground propaganda or passive resistance (a withdrawal from active social life) as the most effective and just one percent mentioned terroristic acts. Thus, the veterans prefer massive legal forms of struggle.

From this it can be assumed that in the event that an acute crisis situation were to break out in our country the veterans would actively take part, primarily, in peaceful mass forms of struggle but would not abandon armed methods. The "decisive intentions" of a majority of the Afghan veterans can be seen from the fact that two-thirds of them would be ready to volunteer for any country where the people are fighting for their independence. Characteristically, many of them are indifferent as to precisely where they would go and they are ready to go to any country in the world. Of the specific nations mentioned by our respondents, first place was shared by Nicaragua and Afghanistan and a significantly smaller number of young persons named Lebanon, Angola, El Salvador and Chile. Figuring for some were such countries as Libya, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Cuba, South Africa, Panama and even...the United States, Italy and China.

But against what social institutions or strata in our society could such vehement young persons direct their anger? Clearly, it can be assumed that this would be directed primarily at those whom they consider guilty of their misfortunes and difficulties as well as other "bad" or "not good" persons.

The respondents were asked to answer the following question: "There is the opinion that among the representatives of the various social groups positive and negative personal qualities are unequally distributed. For example, such as friendship, honesty, industry, guile, greed and so forth. What do you think about this matter?" The evaluation scale had three levels: "Positive qualities are encountered more often," "Distributed equally" and "Negative qualities are encountered more often."

In the opinion of a predominant majority of those questioned, negative qualities prevail among the representatives of all other nationalities with the exception of one's own, among the workers in the service sphere, party and soviet workers, enterprise leaders, persons engaged in individual labor activity and the representatives of the various youth movements and antisocial groups (criminals, alcoholics, black marketeers). As we can see, the direct actions of the Afghan veterans can be aimed at persons who possess real power or those who, in their opinion, earn too much. Finally, both against the antisocial groups as well as against those youth movements which seem that way to them.³

These data largely are confirmed by the view of those polled of just who was to blame for the serious difficulties which the veterans encountered in returning to a

peacetime life. In first place in terms of "guilt" in the minds of the young veterans, were the party and soviet bodies as well as "the entire system" which they embody. Almost a third of those questioned answered in this way. Second place is held by the administration of the industrial and other enterprises as well as other "bureaucrats," with approximately one-fifth of the young persons. In third place is the Komsomol with 15 percent. Some 10 percent self-critically blamed themselves for their own problems. In fifth place are parents (five percent), all persons around (five percent) or "no one specifically" (five percent). Then follow friends (three percent) and the army and the Ministry of Defense (three percent).

Thus, among the questioned Afghan veterans there is a predominance of contradictory radical-conservative political orientations. The latter express the desire of the veterans for social changes and for which they are ready to fight actively, in employing various methods, right up to extremist ones. However, in acting against the administrative-command system for actual realization the Afghan veterans can offer chiefly different variations of the totalitarian social ideal.

Like other categories of modern youth, inherent to them is a Manichean awareness related, in particular, to a clear dividing of those around into "our own good" and "bad others." One of its manifestations is the "defense mind" which is most clearly represented precisely among the Afghan veterans. Participation in a war which for a long time was "unknown" and then became criminal in the eyes of many Soviet persons had on them a powerful psychotraumatizing and marginalizing effect. For this reason, the veterans of the Afghan War represent an explosive social material which could be ignited rather easily by a spark both from the left and from the right. At the same time, even the rank-and-file Afghan veterans are a very heterogenous group which is differentiated not only in accord with its social origin or current status but also by the nature of involvement in the hostilities, by the length of the stay in Afghanistan, by wounding or disability and most importantly to a moral assessment of their involvement in the undeclared war.

Footnotes

1. In the given article, we are restricting ourselves to an analysis of certain value orientations and social stereotypes in the mass conscience of the Afghan veterans, without reviewing the results of utilizing various psychological methods.

2. In the questionnaire the values of socialism were viewed as demands placed by man on the organization of social life: "The opportunity for each person to count on respect for himself," that is, dignity, good relations between people, mutual aid and support, collectivism and so forth.

3. Similar data were obtained by the sociological service of the USSR Gosteleradio [State Television and Radio]: the questioned Afghan veterans saw themselves, first of all, as active participants in the military-patriotic education of the youth and as assistants of the law enforcement bodies in establishing public order in the nation [3].

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The Demographic Situation in Gomel Oblast (Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident)

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[Article by Anatoliy Gennadyevich Zlotnikov, candidate of economic sciences and docent at the Gomel Cooperative Institute. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] At present, Chernobyl has become a synonym for ecological and social tragedy. This foreboding word more and more frequently is heard in various sorts of disasters: "Chernobyl in Chukotka," "The Aral Chernobyl," "The Belorussian Chernobyl" (almost 500 tons of toxic chemicals were buried at the Drissenskiy Sovkhoz in Verkhnedvinskiy Rayon of Vitebsk Oblast), "Biological Chernobyl," "Social Chernobyl," "Second Chernobyl" and others. The people are not merely naming but also expressing their attitude toward these terrible phenomena. The environment is having a deleterious impact on the demographic processes including life expectancy and state of health, the level of the death rate and birthrate as well as the direction of migrational flows.

As a rule, researchers examine changes in the demographic situation through the prism of socioeconomic factors. However, in recent years the demographic conduct of the population in a number of the nation's regions has begun to be determined by factors of an ecological sort. Their effect has been apparent first of all in the regions which suffered in the accident at the Chernobyl AES and primarily in Gomel Oblast of Belorussia.

In the demographic behavior of the population in Gomel Oblast during the years between the last two censuses, two periods can be established: a favorable one, prior to the tragedy at the Chernobyl AES (1979-1985) and an unfavorable one after the accident (1986-1989). The first period was characterized by significant increases in the size of the population with over 11,000 persons a year. During the second half of 1986, in the oblast there was a sharp drop in the size of the population and then the growth rate was so low that subsequently it was not possible to halt the course of the negative processes. While at the beginning of 1986, 1,678,000 persons lived in the oblast, at the start of 1987, the figure was already 1,667,000 and in 1988, 1,666,000. According to the materials of the 1989 Census, as at the beginning of 1990, there were 1,674,000 persons (1,599,000 according to the 1979 Census). These data characterize 1979-1985 as a period of the most favorable demographic development and 1986-1989 as an unfavorable period.

The highest radioactive contamination occurred in five oblasts: Kiev and Zhitomir (Ukraine), Gomel and Mogilev (Belorussia) as well as Bryansk (RSFSR). Of the 6 oblasts in Belorussia, 5 (with the exception of Vitebsk) have significant territories with a high level of radioactive contamination. Zhitomir and Bryansk Oblasts are among the 17 oblasts of the nation (10 in the RSFSR and 7 in the Ukraine), where during the period between the last two censuses there has been a decline in the total size of the population. If the changes in the size of the population in Gomel, Kiev and Mogilev Oblasts prior to the accident showed a tendency to increase (and in Gomel Oblast the highest rates were noticed), after the accident at the Chernobyl AES the size of the population in these oblasts (Gomel and Kiev after 1986, Mogilev after 1988, when the scale of contamination also became known there) declined sharply (Table 1).

Table 1: Change in the Number of Population in the Oblasts Suffering Most From the Accident at the Chernobyl AES*
(estimate on 1 January, 1,000 persons)

Oblasts	1979**	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989**	1990
RSFSR												
Bryansk	1507	1500	1495	1485	1481	1479	1474	1472	1473	...	1475	1475
Ukraine												
Zhitomir	1597	1594	1589	1578	1570	1560	1551	1547	1543	...	1545	1538
Kiev	1924	1928	1926	1925	1924	1930	1933	1936	1888	...	1940	...
Belorussia												
Gomel	1599	1609	1622	1636	1646	1659	1669	1678	1667	1666	1674	1674
Mogilev	1249	1254	1257	1261	1264	1269	1275	1282	1290	1296	1285	...

* Compiled from: [1-9]. ** From the population census.

Consequently, for Kiev and Mogilev Oblasts also characteristic was the presence of two periods in the demographic conduct of the population and these were directly related to the ecological consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES: favorable before the accident and unfavorable after. But the differing approach in assessing the danger of radioactive contamination in the two republics led to different demographic consequences. In Kiev Oblast, where due to the partial informing of the public the danger of radioactive contamination was recognized much sooner than in the other stricken oblasts, in the first year after the accident the number of the population declined by 50,000 persons. However, by the start of the census they were able not only to reach the population size prior to the accident but also surpass it. In Gomel Oblast, where the danger of radioactive contamination was not recognized by the local leadership and where truthful information was absent, it has not been possible to make up for the demographic losses, even now. In Mogilev Oblast, where due to its supposed distant location from the site of the accident and where they did not give any significance to it in the first year and began to act with a significant delay, the response of the population was also delayed.

The impact of the Chernobyl accident on the demographic conduct of the population in Gomel Oblast and the oblast center which, according to the official data, was not hit at all, was manifested in several ways: a drop in the birthrate, particularly in 1987-1988, an increase in the number of abortions, particularly from the second half of 1986, and a significant shift in the migration processes (Table 2). The total birthrate in 1985 here was 17.6 per thousand, in 1987, it was 14.9 per thousand, in 1988, 16.6 per thousand and in 1989, 15.5 per thousand.¹ However, it is scarcely valid to consider the entire decline in the birthrate in this region to the consequences of the accident at Chernobyl. The problem is that the given trend since 1988 has been typical for a majority of the nation's regions. This was due to the start of a new wave of decline in the birthrate (the second since the Great Patriotic War). But in Gomel Oblast, as in Belorussia as a whole, these two unfavorable trends coincided. The increase in the number of persons entering the region was unexpected but completely explainable: the total immigration rate in 1985 was 49.4 per thousand and in the postaccident period 54.9-56.9 per thousand. The overall emigration coefficient rose from 45.5 per thousand in 1985 to 62.6 per thousand in 1986 (55.6 per thousand in 1987). In recent years, the intensity of emigration declined but not only in the oblast center.

Table 2: Basic Demographic Indicators of Gomel Oblast,* per thousand

Area	Birthrate					Death Rate					Net Immigration					Net Emigration				
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Total for oblast	17.6	17.2	14.9	16.6	15.5	10.4	9.4	9.8	10.1	10.2	49.3	56.9	55.7	54.9	45.8	45.5	62.6	55.6	46.3	46.1
Including:																				
—Urban locality	19.4	19.0	16.0	17.9	17.2	7.2	6.9	6.9	7.2	7.6	55.5	54.9	56.4	56.0	45.9	40.3	52.1	47.9	39.8	40.6
—Oblast center	18.2	17.7	15.1	16.8	16.1	6.7	6.3	6.5	6.5	7.0	53.4	50.0	49.5	47.3	41.9	37.0	40.7	39.0	34.8	39.6
—Rural locality	14.7	15.1	13.1	14.3	12.7	15.1	13.0	14.5	15.0	14.9	39.9	60.1	54.4	53.0	43.4	53.4	79.6	68.7	57.7	56.1

* Calculated from the primary accounting data of the Oblast Statistical Administration.

The basic reason for the migrational loss of the population from the oblast, in our opinion, is the information famine for the problems related to the Chernobyl accident. The population was unable to obtain an intelligible answer to the question of the radiation level and the degree of contamination of various territories by cesium and strontium or on the impact of radioactive contamination on health. The people were unable to understand why the residents were moved out of the 30-km zone but teams to prepare fodder were sent in there.

A month after the Chernobyl accident, we carried out an analysis of materials from a questionnaire on the problem of the effectiveness of propaganda activities at the Gomel Radio Plant (334 persons were questioned), and there were several questions related to the consequences of the accident at Chernobyl which was 130 km from the oblast center. Over 2/3 of the respondents stated

that most often in recent days they had been bothered by the problem of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. However, the lecturers and propagandists did not have information on the actual state of affairs. Only the superior oblast leadership had this.

Information collected immediately after was provided to the party bodies but the authorities did not pay proper attention to this. The necessary measures were not taken. This complicated the attitude of the public to the party bodies² and led to errors in migration policy. For example, the settlers from the 30-km zone were built housing in other rayons which after careful metering turned out to be in a number of instances not the best in terms of the level of radiation contamination. Up to now the activities of the oblast and republic leaders have been viewed extremely negatively. For example, among the ecological demands heard at numerous meetings and

assemblies in the oblast and republic as well as in the statements of the strike committees were appeals to initiate criminal proceedings against the oblast and republic leaders for concealing information on the true state of affairs with the radiation situation.

The lack of information teaches the people to read between the lines and forms the stereotype that if accurate figures are not given or if the dosimetric instruments are confiscated then this means that there is something to conceal. And the conditions of life are judged unfavorable. All of this has led to radiophobia and to the circulating of rumors and heresay. This, naturally, was reflected in increased migration from the Gomel area. It would be hard to describe the crowds of people at the Gomel stations in May-June 1986. Here the older generation recalled the streams of refugees in 1941.

At the same time, the data of the Oblast Statistical Administration show an increase in the number of persons moving into the oblast territory. This seemingly unnatural situation was caused by the movement out of the 30-km zone. However, while previously Gomel was a place where inhabitants of other regions of the nation endeavored to move, as of now they have no such desire. At present, a resident of Gomel finds it virtually impossible to exchange his housing for an apartment in other cities of the republic and nation. The migration rise in the population of the oblast center during the postaccident period declined by 1.5-fold. The increase in the size of Gomel's population has dropped by 4- or 5-fold: while prior to the accident it had high indicators for the absolute increase in the size of the population (an

average of 13,500 persons a year) among the major cities of the Soviet Union, now it is in one of the last places in this group. In 1988, the size of Gomel's population increased by just 3,000 persons and in 1989, by 6,000.

Let us examine the dynamics for the growth of morbidity in the adult and child population of Gomel and Mogilev, in comparison with an oblast center which did not suffer in the accident (in Table 3 this is Grodno, where large chemical industry enterprises are operating). The leadership of the USSR Minzdrav [Ministry of Health] and the Belorussian Minzdrav feels that this increase was due to an improved quality of diagnostics making it possible to more effectively detect illnesses. As was shown by a discussion of the problems involved in implementing the Belorussian State Program for Eliminating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident at a traveling session of the Presidium of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences in Mogilev as well as the work of the interrepublic scientific-practical conference "Chernobyl: Socioeconomic and Moral Aspects," practicing physicians and scientists in the republic have a different viewpoint. In their opinion, this was primarily the result of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident [10-11]. According to all indicators, with the exception of the illnesses involving the organs of hearing and the skin in children, the average annual increase rates for illnesses in Gomel and Mogilev over the last 3 1/2 years since the accident were higher than in Grodno. And while in Grodno the level of the six types of illnesses has declined among the adult population, in Gomel a similar trend has been recorded only for one indicator.

Table 3: Indicators for the Morbidity of the Population in a Number of Belorussian Cities*

Types of Illnesses	Adult Population			Children		
	Gomel	Mogilev	Grodno	Gomel	Mogilev	Grodno
Neoplasms	3.84/28.7	3.72/13.9	3.48/-12.1	—	—	—
Hypertensive illness	35.28/38.4	64.08/19.4	35.64/-2.5	—	—	—
Ischemic heart disease	43.56/29.9	46.92/53.8	32.64/2.8	—	—	—
Illnesses of						
—Eyes	3.00/135.4	7.92/27.2	2.88/-23.9	14.64/89.5	12.12/44.0	8.52/12.3
—Hearing organs	2.83/6.2	9.73/33.6	3.24/-20.7	36.04/59.8	57.24/110.2	37.66/77.4
—Upper respiratory tracts	178.20/37.7	391.56/34.4	82.56/-15.5	1161.72/23.8	1186.32/29.0	742.56/-7.9
—Digestive organs	43.68/31.7	42.48/17.0	26.88/1.4	23.88/60.6	26.12/51.1	21.84/20.4
—Urogenital system	6.72/28.3	14.04/27.3	8.04/24.1	4.43/86.8	5.04/84.7	5.52/40.0
—Skin	3.36/2.7	20.28/22.9	5.16/-18.2	5.52/-8.6	22.08/27.3	5.64/119.2
—Other illnesses of respiratory organs	63.84/33.6	122.88/34.9	42.12/22.8	365.28/50.7	309.36/25.5	166.80/4.8

* Calculated from the data of the automated information system Health of the USSR Goskomstat [State Statistics Committee]. The numerator—the indicator of relative morbidity per 1,000 inhabitants in 1988; the denominator—the annual average increase rate (decline) in the relative morbidity over 1985-1988, %.

We would point out that the ecological situation in Gomel related to the release of harmful substances into the atmosphere of the oblast center has significantly improved. The release of harmful substances per city inhabitant over the last 3 years has declined by more than 20 percent. Is this not proof of the influence of other factors and in particular the consequences of the Chernobyl accident on the increased morbidity of the city's population?

At present, the inhabitants of Gomel and the Gomel area suffer from chronic illnesses including: vascular, neurological, gastrointestinal, endocrinal and of the respiratory tracts. The organism is finding it evermore difficult to protect itself from flu as was clearly demonstrated by the epidemic in the winter of 1989-1990.

As for the mortality level of the population in Gomel Oblast, it has become even lower in the postaccident period. Thus, the total death rate in 1985 equaled 10.4 per thousand and after the accident it was: in 1986, 9.4 per thousand, in 1987, 9.8 per thousand, in 1988, 10.1 per thousand and in 1989 10.2 per thousand. The assumption may occur that the consequences of the accident were not so terrible as the death rate (and particularly infantile) has shown a tendency to drop. But the problem is that the most active migrants were families where one of the members had poor health or a predisposition for illness. The healthier population remained on the spot, however after a sharp drop in 1986, the death rate in the oblast began to steadily rise.

In 1985-1988, the indicator of the infant death rate was, respectively: 16.3, 13.4, 14.1 and 12.1 per thousand [12] and this correlates with the trend for a drop in the birthrate: the lower the birthrate, the lower infant mortality. Conversely, a higher birthrate is accompanied by a rise in the level of infant mortality. Moreover, many women under conditions of radiation uncertainty and, hence, the danger of a radioactive effect on offspring, have deferred their plans to have a child. Under these conditions, the families which considered themselves healthier took the risk. Naturally, when healthier (according to their own subjective views) women began to give birth, there was a decline in the indicator of infant mortality. This means that there are no grounds to consider the demographic situation in the oblast favorable all the more as since the accident at Chernobyl there has been a rise in abortions. The USSR Minzdrav and the Belorussian Minzdrav are endeavoring to distance themselves from the increasing number of abortions and protect "the honor of the uniform," stating that the public health bodies did not give recommendations to pregnant women to terminate pregnancy and that this is a private initiative of the women themselves and a result of their radiophobia.

Of course, if the public health system is identified just with the personnel of the ministries or the oblast public health departments, then no one saw their written instructions on this question. However, the public health system is not only and not so much the personnel of the

ministries and the oblast public health departments as it is the ordinary physicians and midwives to whom the pregnant women turned for advice and consultation. And a majority of the physicians under the existing conditions considered a birth undesirable. If the bureaucracy did not see possible harm, the regular physicians considered otherwise. According to those materials available to us (they have been verified by an analysis of the data on the birthrate for the months of 1986 and 1987), one can state a significant increase in abortions from May 1986 and their number in individual regions of the oblast more than doubled.

The tragedy of Chernobyl has shown that indifference and negligence, callousness and hate at present are becoming almost the same sources of danger as a war. There is a dividing of people not only in the zone but even in the nation, that is, the irradiated and those receiving radiation, on the one hand, and those who are still clean on this level, on the other. Even recreation for inhabitants of the Chernobyl zone is a problem as many do not want to have contact with them. This was seen also from the nonfulfillment of the program for moving the residents out of the stricken rayons into the neighboring oblasts of Belorussia. In this year alone, 7,500 families should be moved out of the most heavily contaminated rayons but as a total during the current and subsequent years, around 21,000 families should be moved out of the unfavorable zones of Gomel and Mogilev Oblasts. This migration strikes at the plans for improving the living conditions of inhabitants in those rayons where the flow of migrants is being directed. Moreover, at present the demographic problem arises of how marriages are to be concluded between inhabitants from the radioactive and nonradioactive zones. This problem, as the experience of Japan indicates, will be aggravated.

The antinuclear syndrome is a natural response of people encompassing all spheres. Clearly, the tragedy of Chernobyl is not only a national but also a common human disaster. Everything possible must be done so that dissatisfaction in the region does not build up like radiation. If at present we are unable to resolve the problems confronting us, then it will be too late to resolve them tomorrow, for Chernobyl is being turned into a political problem.

Footnotes

1. Of course, demography in its arsenal has more precise methods and indicators (age and total birthrates, age coefficients for mortality) in comparison with the ones which we are using here. But the author has used the most accessible indicators (since those who view the demographic situation as favorable [12] refer to them) in order to disclose the real situation in the system and in these simple indicators.

2. The confrontation can be seen from the results of the elections to the USSR people's deputies. Thus, the first secretary of the Gomel Party Obkom who ran in the elections in the spring of 1989 (the only candidate for six rayons which although not adjacent to the Chernobyl AES but, as it turned out, had suffered as much as the rayons which were partially within the 30-km zone of Chernobyl) won just 36.3 percent of the votes. Not elected to the USSR people's deputies were the first secretaries of the Gomel and Mogilev Belorussian CP Obkom (those regions of the republic which suffered most from the accident at Chernobyl and where for an extended time there was only partial information about it).

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Control of Deviant Behavior by the State and Society

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[Article by Svertlana Gavrilovna Klimova, candidate of philosophical sciences and science association at the Sector for Social Problems of Alcoholism and Drug Addiction under the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Our journal has published her articles: "Attitude of Urban Dwellers to the Immediate Social Environment" (No 3, 1979) and "Interpersonal Assessment in Business Interaction" (co-author, No 5, 1988). A study of social control in terms of antisocial conduct has been made by us within the Scientific Research Project on "Deviant Conduct Under the Conditions of Social Changes and Reform" of the Academy Program "Man, Science, Society" since 1989]

[Text] The notions of social control which have existed for a long time in Soviet sociology reflected a real situation of all-permeating control by state officials and their volunteer assistants over ordinary citizens. In the 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s, Soviet scientists examined the problem of social control in the context of subordinating the behavior of individuals to the demands of society (a synonym of which was the state) and the working class (in the form of the communist party). Correspondingly, only the state, a labor collective and the family could be the principals of social control. Strongly condemned were the "limited approaches of bourgeois sociologists" who were interested in the mechanisms of norm formation and control in informal groups, as it was considered that only a structure could be a principal of control where "there is control, discipline and responsibility" [1, p 20], and an administration and its volunteer assistants: comrade courts, volunteer personnel departments, commissions for combating

drunkenness, worker honor councils and so forth [ibid.]. As incentives for normal behavior predominantly they envisaged negative sanctions, ideological pressure, public opinion formed on the principles of "reciprocal exactingness" [1, pp 13, 21; 2, pp 44-45].

These concepts reflected a part of social practice which was realized by the state institutions of control and was becoming ever-less effective in overcoming deviant behavior. The ineffectiveness of formal punitive-repressive control was particularly apparent in effecting deviant behavior of a passive type (drunkenness, drug addiction). A rigid, impersonal mechanism which possessed enormous inertia was capable only of increasing the social stratum of outsiders.

Our research on the alcoholic behavior of youth in Moscow Oblast (1988) showed that the consequences of the 1985 Ukase on Combating Drunkenness were not uniform: the young persons who possessed great social resources (a high level of education and a high social status of parents; successful studies providing prospects for social advancement; warm, understanding relations in the family) turned to alcohol later, in comparison with 1984, and used it significantly more rarely than before. But the "multiproblem" juveniles whose alcoholic habits previously had concerned educators did not begin to drink less and more rarely. On the contrary, among them there was a growing awareness of their own haplessness and alienation: "We have gotten together because we despise the fortunate."

The "stages of the great path" provided by the state institutions for the socializing and social control of such juveniles are predetermined. This is classifying in the caste of outcasts in school and after 8th grade the "culling" in the PTU [vocational-technical school], where the concentration of problem juveniles even more impedes the possibility of correction, and the most recalcitrant are sent to the special PTU which are more reminiscent of a juvenile corrective labor colony. The next infraction and the young person is sent to prison. And although the workers themselves at the inspectorates for juvenile affairs, the special PTU and the colonies assert that these measures have never rehabilitated anyone, nevertheless the system continues to crush the fate of the children [3; 4]. Some of the young persons do succeed in completing the vocational school without the prefix "special" and some return from the colony and try to adapt to surrounding life. However, only monotonous, low-skilled labor at obsolete enterprises remains for them. Certainly, the range of personal problems which they did not learn to handle in their youth are still with them: secrecy, aggressiveness, anxiety and the inability to adequately perceive oneself and others. Such persons prefer to escape from the complex situations of life with the aid of a means already known to them, alcohol. The enterprise management still applies punitive-repressive measures to them, such as the loss of bonuses, refusal to provide trips to sanatoriums or vacation homes, loss of place in line for obtaining housing,

forced treatment at LTP [?medical therapeutic center] and, finally, dismissal. This range of "educational actions" reinforces the social isolation of a person and breaks the already weak ties which link him to significant others.

It is the general opinion and primarily among those who have become the victim of criminals or who have suffered from the alcoholic (drug) addictions of their close ones, that repressive measures should be supported. But among the specialists there is a growing conviction as to the ineffectiveness of the current methods of combating deviant behavior [5]. Of the 150 experts questioned by us in Moscow Oblast (including pedagogues, lawyers, workers of the state institutions), only 30 percent supported a hardening of punishments (60 percent in 1984). The remainder proposed alternative measures aimed at prevention and social and psychological rehabilitation. While the punitive measures based on an authoritarian ideology corresponded to the motives in the activities of individuals involved in the state or state-sanctioned public institutions of control, the functionaries actively implemented repressive ideas. Now we are recording increased dissatisfaction with their activities among this category. The consequence of this dissatisfaction is either apathy, passivity or the formal performing of duties or the search for techniques oriented at the social rehabilitation of the outsiders. However, it is extremely difficult to implement alternative techniques within the existing state institutions as there is an inevitable conflict with the orders regulating activity. Thus, it took a good deal of effort for the patients of the Moscow LTP to be allowed to participate in meetings of the Alcoholics Anonymous groups.

The conflict between the imposed role and the moral notions of the functionaries provides a hope that the punitive-repressive mechanism will gradually be transformed from within [6]. But for such a transformation there must be not only a change of ideas, there must be professional training, a knowledge of the techniques of social rehabilitation and prevention and there must be professional social workers. Various social formations have endeavored to compensate for their absence and these formations have appeared over the last 2 years due to the political and legal differentiation between state and society. The "second thaw" has demonstrated a phenomenon of the informal movements. In the motley and noisy flood of political, cultural and ecological associations, there also arose social assistance groups for the outsiders and these represent an alternative and not an opposition to the existing formations: more often it is a choice of parallel structures.

In a study of this phenomenon, there are effective concepts which view the primary groups as agents of social control. In American sociology, such associations

are called borderline organizations [7; 8]. Even an individual with deviant behavior usually endeavors to maintain membership in a group. Collective sanctions control his conduct, although in the group they more rarely employ strong methods of pressure. The "borderline organizations" carry out psychotherapeutic functions even when psychotherapy is not the main aim of their activity. A person can now get by without those who previously rejected him and assume a high position in the new group. This experience subsequently allows him to take on customary age, sexual and status roles and join the broader community.

Just what does this informal movement in support of the outsiders represent and what future can it expect? Are these formations capable of eliminating the contradiction between man's need to organize his own activity in life and the dependence of the latter upon authoritarian institutions? The problems of outsiders are not only the search for "groups of peers" but also the material difficulties, the need for treatment, social rehabilitation and legal defense. Can social formations carry out the designated functions? The research material for the search to answers to these questions is limited and it includes the program documents of the groups (manifestos, leaflets and bylaws) as well as our own personal observations. Certainly the typology of the movements can be approximate. On the basis of the program and current documents of the support groups for outsiders, we have established four directions taking as the criterion the degree of autonomy from the state structures.

In the **first** are self-help groups which consist of former alcoholics, drug addicts and persons who have served time in prison. Here the most influential is the Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) movement and which has taken on the traditions of the international movement of the same name. At present, in Moscow there are about ten groups conducting active missionary activities in other cities of the nation. It is rather difficult to say anything definite about their numbers, degree of stability or social composition. From personal observation their main contingent is made up of males who are representatives of the worker professions or the lumpenized stratum of workers in mental labor with great alcoholic experience but who have maintained their physical and intellectual health. The latter helps them reflect on their conduct as well as accept the spiritual values offered by the program. In these groups there are no regular (paid) co-workers or hierarchical structure of relations, and the rules provide for special procedures which prevent a monopoly of influence and power (the chairing of meetings in turn, the dispersion of organizational functions and so forth). In principle, they refuse material support from the state and charitable funds, but they do use rooms which are made available by the plant clubs, the sobriety society and the housing offices. If attempts at ideological pressure follow this, they prefer to get rid of the interference.

Within the self-help movement, artels, brigades and communes for joint work arise. These either are single

actions related to seasonal trades (trips to lumbering areas, collecting of medicinal grasses and so forth) or permanent employment in agriculture. As of now we know only of one agricultural artel under the Oasis Group in Leningrad.

Alcoholics Anonymous do not enter into civil law relations with state and public organizations, they do not have recourse to paid services of specialists and do not provide material support for their members. Their viability depends basically upon their own activeness. The authorities and public opinion consider AA favorably but this cannot be said about the self-help groups for drug addicts. The latter, as a rule, do not advertise their activities due to the greater alienation of addicts from society and the criminal nature of the environment in which they are. Nevertheless, in Moscow there has appeared the Transnational Radical Party of Antiprohibitionists. At present, this party has around 300 members, basically young persons. They favor the legalizing of the drug trade, assuming that this will reduce the criminal element, destroy the economic base of the Mafia, and protect the addicts from the harshness of the Soviet penitentiary system. Here the social rehabilitation of the drug addicts is of a sporadic nature: those who have gotten free of their addiction to drugs gain the skills of living in society due to political activity and not due to special psychotherapeutic programs.

The **second** area is the groups which have an organizational structure and the status of a legal entity. These are set up most often under charitable funds and societies. The most active is the Social Center for Assisting in Humanizing the Penitentiary System in the USSR (in the past, the Group Prison and Freedom). Its nucleus is made up of veterans of the human rights movement. The Social Center has Bylaws, a managerial structure (a leader, deputy, project leaders and over 20 hired co-workers). Activities are financed by cooperatives and private individuals and in part by the International Fund for the Survival and Development of Mankind with the center being part of this. A significant portion of the work is done by volunteers (30 persons) without any payment. The Social Center carries out the following programs: "Creating a Service for Aiding Prisoners," "The Subculture of Prisoners and the Problem of Humanizing the Penitentiary System in the USSR," "Alternative Punishments," "Protection of the Personality and Life of the Prisoner," "Humanization of Institutions for Juvenile Lawbreakers," "The Protection of Maternity and Infancy in Places of Incarceration" and "Protection of Condemned Business People (Entrepreneurs) in the USSR." The Center provides material, legal and medical aid to prisoners and attracts volunteers for corresponding with them. The Center's research work is oriented at analyzing the activities of the corrective institutions in the nation and the results are turned over to the mass information media, the deputies and the law enforcement bodies.

The "Egos" group for assisting alcoholics and drug addicts in Moscow is sponsored by a charity fund, the

groups Optimist in Leningrad and Trust in Kurgan by the Sobriety Society. The programs are carried out by professional psychologists and psychiatrists. They are based upon different ideological and philosophical concepts. Those which draw on Western experience give more attention to propagandizing common human values in the context of the Christian tradition (the patients of the Soviet-American Center for the Combating of Alcoholism). Other focus attention of their members on instilling strength of will and the cognitive aspects of the alcohol problem (the former patients of Dr A.G. Shichko and his students). In the last groups the influence of the leader is strong. Specialists have debated the method of A.G. Shichko, however group support and the desire to create their own living environment have an indisputable psychotherapeutic affect. Like AA, these clubs endeavor to maintain contacts among their members, they conduct missionary activity and publish propaganda literature [9].

A majority of the groups united around psychotherapeutic programs hold the opposite position, striving for independence, on the one hand, and endeavoring to "find a roof" or be taken over by an influential social or state organization, on the other. The presence of a "roof" would provide an opportunity to pay for the services of professionals, to keep paid co-workers, to organize shelters for the homeless and drug addicts and obtain financial support. But here there is the danger of bureaucratization and growing control by the state. One such official organization is the Society for Saving Children From Alcohol and Drugs established in April 1989. It is supported by sponsors, the mass information media and the state. It has proposed opening confidential consultation points, rehabilitation centers, rehabilitation camps for children from the risk groups as well as a hot line. As for now it is still too early to speak about the practical results of the work done by this society. However, its activities show that punitive-repressive ideas are giving way to alternative methods for overcoming the alienation of the outsiders from society.

The **third** direction is the charitable activities of the church. For now the priests have limited themselves to soul-saving talks with alcoholics and drug addicts in the hospitals or in circles under the church. In order to establish shelters, community groups and artels, quarters are needed as well as permission to use land and participate in economic activity. If one considers the growing interest in religion, such activities can find supporters and become very effective.

In the **fourth** area of the social movement in support of outsiders, one can put the activities of specialists who endeavor to establish alternative help programs inside the existing state institutions. Among them are physicians, sociologists and psychologists. They have set two goals for themselves: to make their activities more reasonable and meaningful and to provide society with models for reorganizing its institutions. These persons work in the centers for the rehabilitation of the Afghan War veterans, the narcological treatment centers and the

juvenile corrective facilities. The enthusiasts who decide upon nontraditional forms of activity within the state institutions often come into conflict with their own superiors. And when the leader himself becomes the initiator of innovations, there is inevitable conflict with that portion of the collective which is unable to surmount its own incompetence and aggressiveness. The press has frequently described the active resistance of a foot-dragging majority to the leaders of schools, clubs and colonies which endeavor to humanize the work of these institutions.

A repressive orientation by the state institutions controlling deviant conduct has also been criticized by the liberal intelligentsia. But opposite attitudes are also arising in society and groups have appeared such as the Fight Against Evil which are dissatisfied with the liberal, in their opinion, attitude of the authorities toward hippies, alcoholics and drug addicts, homeless and prostitutes. These are the Lyubertsy from the Moscow area, the Active Actions Detachment from Leningrad, the Orenburg Nishtyaki and others. Their activities include extremist propaganda actions against the "Jew-Masons" who supposedly have turned the Russian people into drunkards and even the assaulting of those who seem suspicious to the "fighters." On the basis of such groups, organized criminal bands have arisen [10, pp 166-167; 11, pp 196-201]. Here there are no attempts to create anything original and creative for an alternative lifestyle. A low cultural level and aggressiveness stimulated by an inferiority complex prevent the members of these groups from offering society any new plans for solving the problems which they seek to overcome.

The alternative movements in support of the outsiders are a component element in the general social activeness which returns sovereignty to man over his life. Within the framework of implementing the psychotherapeutic, social and economic programs, it becomes possible to test out alternative solutions to the hard-to-recognize and diverse problems of defiant conduct. They provide an opportunity for a person to find new degrees of freedom, to work out new models of conduct, roles and ideas without the risk of an immediate sanction for violating the prescripts of official ideology. There is one other positive result in the appearance of the alternative movements and this is the practical infeasibility of total social control over the group and individual and which was our reality in the preceding decades.

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Muscovites on Elections

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[Article by Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Demidov, candidate of philosophical sciences and head of the Sector for Studying Public Opinion of Muscovites of the Sociology Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The elections of people's deputies to the republic and local soviets have concluded. Now the bodies of legislative power have been reorganized from top to bottom on a fundamentally new basis. Certain results can be given. In the given article, an analysis of the political situation has been made from the viewpoint of two previous election campaigns and the results of studying public opinion among the Moscow residents and these were obtained in the course of regular polls of the capital's population over the last 18 months. In particular, let us examine in greater detail how the state of public opinion influenced voter behavior in the choice of the elections, and for this we must ascertain, in the first place, the general background of the election fight or, in other words, voter opinion on urgent problems of the sociopolitical and economic life of the nation. Secondly, the attitude of the public to the electoral system,

thirdly, assessments of the organization and execution of the election campaign, and finally, and fourthly, voter preferences on the candidates for people's deputies.

The election campaign began to get underway at the end of the fourth year of perestroyka, some 6 months after the 19th All-Union Party Conference and on which public opinion placed great hopes for improving the state of affairs in all spheres of our life. They had just adopted the amendments and supplements to the USSR Constitution as well as the new Law on the Elections of USSR People's Deputies. During this period after the excitement which accompanied the preparations for the party forum, there was a definite drop in the public mood and again skeptical notes could be clearly heard. This was manifested above all in the attitude toward the party. While prior to the conference more than 1/2 of those questioned assumed that the authority and influence of the CPSU in society were rising, around 1/5 voiced the opinion that there would not be any changes and only 3 percent assumed that over the long run party authority and influence should decline, while the cross-section of public opinion after the concluding of the 19th Party Conference provided a completely different picture. Only 23 percent of those questioned pointed to increased authority and influence of the party, while 37 percent stated that the situation had not changed at all and 17 percent of the respondents spoke directly about a decline in CPSU authority. (We would point out, incidentally, that a year later, in the summer of 1989, 70 percent of those questioned now pointed to a decline in confidence in the CPSU.)

The Muscovites also took a very skeptical attitude toward amendments in the USSR Constitution concerning the electoral system. In December 1989, only 18 percent of those polled felt that the adopted laws to a significant degree would contribute to the development of democracy in the nation. Such skepticism was fully explainable since over a protracted historical period we have adopted a multiplicity of good laws, decrees and decisions which were later emasculated in the course of their practical implementation by the executive bodies which concentrated real political and economic power in their hands. In particular, doubt was voiced over the procedure for electing 1/3 of the people's deputies from the public organizations, the procedure for proposing and registering candidate deputies, the antidemocratic practice of preelection district meetings which steadily filtered out declared candidates to the benefit of the partocracy. All of this could not help but tell on the state of public opinion and the attitude of the population to the adopted election laws.

The negative views in the minds of the people were intensified by the slipping of the economic reform. According to the same poll, just 6 percent of the respondents felt that the state of the national economy was satisfactory while around 70 percent was critical. The problems of interethnic relations began to cause ever-greater fears. Only Soviet foreign policy and domestic democratization were viewed affirmatively, however

even here 55 percent of those questioned expressed satisfaction with what had been achieved.

The listed processes in mass conscience occurred against the background of its further politization, greater active-ness of the broad strata and groups of the public, the developing independent movement and the flourishing of street democracy. It is no surprise that under these conditions there was a sharp rise in the overall critical attitude which accompanied an assessment of the course of perestroika as a whole. Around 1/2 of those polled pointed out that their hopes tied to perestroika had not been realized, 37 percent said this had partially been realized and only 3 percent of the respondents had hopes that were fully realized.

Under these conditions, just what characterized the 1989 election campaign? First of all, there was voter active-ness which increased as voting day drew closer. Remaining in our memory were stormy voter district meetings which, as a rule, lasted far beyond midnight, televised and nontelevised debates of the candidates, official and independent posters and leaflets which praised certain candidates and were often inaccurate about others, pickets at subway stations and many other attributes of a real developing political struggle.

What candidate deputies did the Muscovites prefer? First of all, the voters focused on personality. For more than 1/2 of those polled, the main thing was human and professional qualities in the candidate and not his position, profession or even belonging to one or another sociopolitical organization. Among the personal qualities in first place were put honesty, decency and a feeling of social justice. Such preferences of course were manifested due to the stereotype which has formed in mass conscience of the corrupted representative of power, the bureaucrat, concerned solely with his own problems, worried about his personal privileges and violating social justice. In addition, an absence of a developed political structure in society was felt and this did not make it possible for the voter to focus on the membership of the candidate in one or another political organization. Party membership was not a factor which determined voter choice. But there was the other factor that belonging to the party apparatus immediately reduced the candidate's chances. The most popular with the Muscovites were representatives of the creative intelligentsia, including journalists, scientists and writers. In second place came workers followed by economic leaders.

In preparing to vote, the voters most often focused on the candidate's election program and more precisely on his position and attitude toward urgent problems. These possibly were not so apparent in the text of the program as they were in the entire flow of information which the candidate was able to get across to the voter. Incidentally, in 1989, the voters obtained the basic mass of information needed by them from the mass information media, followed by pamphlets and election posters and to a lesser degree from the personal speeches of the candidate deputies.

What did the Muscovites not like in the preparations for last year's elections? Above we have spoken about the shortcomings of the legislation apparent in the stage of discussing the draft Election Law. These views (the district meetings, the elections in public organizations and the procedure for putting up candidates) continued to cause dissatisfaction in the course of the election campaign itself. People expressed greatest dissatisfaction over the unequal status of the candidates (having in mind primarily the material and technical opportunities to conduct an election campaign) as well as the creating of beneficial conditions by the authorities for some and obstacles for others who were "not to the liking" of the party apparatus for various reasons. In addition, the persons questioned by us pointed to the discourtesy in conducting the election campaign and the use of prohibited methods, primarily attempts to compromise the opponent.

Regardless of the listed shortcomings recorded by mass conscience, as a whole, around 80 percent of the Muscovites was satisfied with the 1989 election results as persons having real authority among the people and who are active supporters of perestroika became deputies.

The First Congress of USSR People's Deputies which followed the elections for the first time in our history demonstrated real political pluralism in the superior bodies of the nation. The critical and sharp judgments heard from such a high rostrum simply shocked many. In any event, virtually no one was indifferent. From the obtained data, 96-98 percent of the Muscovites followed the entire work of the congress and a large portion did this regularly.

The respondents also judged the democraticness of the congress work very high. As for the assessments of the success of the congress's work, here our polls showed significant fluctuations depending upon the events occurring at the congress. From 24 percent to 36 percent of the Muscovites on one or another day pointed out that the congress was going much more successfully than they had expected.

The public polls conducted a day later clearly recorded both the increased expectations and a certain disappointment with the results of the congress. While prior to its start, some 2/3 of the Muscovites assumed that the work of the deputies would be successful and effective, after the conclusion only a third of those polled gave such a view.

The First Congress of People's Deputies accelerated the development of political processes in the nation and activated mass conscience. The escaped genie of pluralism caused a reassessment of existing notions and stereotypes. This has begun to be apparent in the views of not only history but also the modern political system. In July 1989, over 1/2 of the Muscovites uniformly favored the repeal of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. The attitude toward a multiparty system became more

tolerant, although the dominant view in social conscience in that period was that in and of itself a multi-party system does not determine the level of democracy in the nation. Possible factions in the Congress and in the party itself began to seem acceptable although the opinion still prevailed that it was better to maintain unity.

Some 10-13 percent of the Muscovites questioned by us during that period were firm supporters of maintaining the principles of the former political system, around 25 percent favored insignificant changes in maintaining the underlying principles of the former system, 10-15 percent were unable to voice their position while around 50 percent favored substantial changes in the sphere of sociopolitical relations.

If one speaks about individual sociodemographic groups, the more critical and radical judgments were voiced by the ITR [engineer and technical personnel] and (to a somewhat lesser degree) by representatives of the intelligentsia not employed in production (physicians, teachers, scientists and journalists), more moderate by workers as well as employees of state institutions. In the age groups standing out is the middle generation of 30-45-year-olds who were most critical of the situation and maintained more radical judgments on many questions even in comparison with the youth. In terms of educational level, one can trace a clearly expressed linear dependence: the higher the education, the more critical assessments and radical judgments.

Among the events which had a noticeable impact on the state of mass political conscience during the period between the 1989 and 1990 electoral campaigns, one must also mention the wave of strikes which swept the nation in the summer of 1989 and the regular outbursts at the centers of interethnic conflicts. The attitude of the Muscovites to strikes was complex: of course, they are undesirable and cause great harm but sometimes they are admissible and even necessary. In one way or another, in being superimposed on the increasing problems and difficulties in the economic sphere, the wave of strikes heightened the critical attitudes in society. There was a clearly voiced demand for more decisive changes, however there was no unanimity over the question of precisely what changes were required. For example, on the question of introducing a ration system for supply, the opinions of the Muscovites were split virtually equally. The supporters and opponents of market relations also were evenly split.

In addition to the economic problems related to the public's notions primarily of the supply of vital necessities and which for the last 2 years has been in first place in terms of importance in the course of our polls, with the start of autumn the problem of combating crime emerged in second place in terms of importance in the public conscience, in bypassing the problem of protecting the environment. Interethnic relations in the capital itself did not greatly bother the Muscovites although $\frac{1}{3}$ of our respondents still noticed their exacerbation in Moscow as well.

The absence of real headway in resolving the listed problems very noticeably reduced the credit of trust in the measures of the superior authorities and the policy of perestroika as a whole. The obtained data concerning public opinion showed that the expectations of a majority of those polled were not being met and as a whole the situation in the nation was deteriorating. A further decline in the authority of the CPSU and its leading bodies was also recorded.

In analyzing the state of mass conscience in that period, one cannot help but mention the growing independent movement and the appearance of alternative political structures in the form of associations, platforms and actually parties. This led as a result to the formation of electoral blocs in the 1990 elections. While in 1989, the numerous "informal" organizations did not represent a real political force and a majority of the Muscovites did not see them as real claimants to power, after the First Congress of People's Deputies, the situation began to change. A major role was played by the establishing of the Interregional Deputy Group (MDG) and around this the alternative political structures began to gather. At the end of 1989, our poll showed that the activities of the MDG were approved basically by 57 percent of the Muscovites. The results of the past elections to the Moscow Soviet and the RSFSR from Moscow showed that this support from the public has increased.

Along with the listed trends, we cannot help but mention one other, rather contradictory trend in mass conscience, and which rather strongly influenced voter behavior in the course of the 1990 elections. We said that a pluralism of opinions, a boldness of judgments and vivid speeches at the first congress were welcomed by the public, however over time the street democracy began to cause irritation. This trend was apparent with particular strength after the Second Congress of People's Deputies which caused dissatisfaction among a significant portion of the public precisely due to the lack of decisions on the most important questions of the state structure, property and so forth.

Precisely this determined, in our view, the mood with which the voters entered the 1990 election campaign. Even 3 months prior to the elections, the mass information media began to note a certain decline in voter activeness in comparison with the previous year, although interest in the coming elections was quite high: over 70 percent of those polled pointed out that they were concerned who would be elected as members of the republic and local soviets. During that period around 74 percent of the Muscovites intended to vote on 4 March. However, at the end of January and the beginning of February 1990, we recorded a decline in the given indicator by 10 percent. However, in our view, this showed not so much a drop in the activeness of the

Muscovites as a response to a number of questions which arose in the course of the election campaign.

As a result, the Law on Elections to the Republic and Local Soviets was positively received. There was satisfaction, first of all, with the abandoning of the district meetings and the election of deputies by public organizations. However, the very procedure and organization of the elections undoubtedly influenced the fact that on 4 March a significantly smaller number of Muscovites went to the voter urns than in the previous spring. The electing of deputies all at once to three levels of soviets in four voter districts, the necessity of making one's way through 20 or 30 names of candidates of course could not help but lead to confusion among a portion of the voters and a refusal to vote generally, as a sort of defensive response. Moreover, the distribution of information about the candidates was extremely poorly organized. Even official election posters appeared in Moscow in a majority of the districts only 2 weeks prior to the elections. In this sense the provision of the law on observing the equality of candidates in utilizing materiel for the election campaign did poor service. The candidates were fettered in their actions, looking hopefully at the district commissions which were unable to promptly get the necessary information to the public. According to our data, a predominant majority of the voters a month prior to the elections did not know a single one of their candidates to all levels of the soviets.

Thus, while in the course of the 1989 campaign, there was a tendency for growing voter activity among the public and a focus on participation in voting as election day drew near, in the spring of 1990, the trend was the reverse.

The preference of the Muscovites on their candidate people's deputies as a whole was the same as in the spring of 1989, however the criteria of the social justice, honesty and incorruptibility of the candidate, in remaining extremely high for the voters, moved to second place, giving way to competence. It is no accident that lawyers were given the highest rating among all professions. Undoubtedly, the voters were led to this by observing the work of the USSR people's deputies.

The demands of competence, a knowledge of the laws and professional political skills which the voters placed on the deputies reflect the current level of our experience in parliamentary activities. In the future, we feel, precisely civil, political and moral positions will again emerge in the forefront among the demands made on the deputies, since professionalism is required primarily for experts. In any event, no competent deputy can possess professional knowledge on all discussed questions. There is no need for this.

What else influenced the choice of the Muscovites? An important factor was the place of residence of the candidate. Around 70 percent of the Moscow voters preferred to see a deputy residing in their rayon. And this applied not only to the elections to the rayon soviet but

also to the Moscow Soviet and even the Russian Parliament. As a result, 80 percent of the elected deputies of the Moscow Soviet reside in the region where they ran. Party affiliation of the candidates, as before, did not have great importance for the voters, however in comparison with the 1989 elections, there was a tendency to prefer nonparty persons. This also was reflected in the voting results: 58 percent of the communists was elected to the Moscow Soviet and this was $\frac{1}{4}$ less in comparison with the make-up of the USSR people's deputies.

The people preferred candidates whom they knew better, as they say, recognizing their face. This was the case if the candidate was not a resident but at least worked in the rayon. The voters also preferred to be personally acquainted with the candidate, either in meetings or at least in TV debates. Newspaper articles or even pamphlets had significantly less effect since the people did not trust the impartiality of the press. Male candidates were preferred over female. The voters focused rather strongly on the support of workers but due to the fact that extremely few of them were running, the share of this social group in the make-up of the new soviets was small.

The appearance of preelection blocs, a sort of prototype of political parties of the parliamentary type became one other important and new aspect in the 1990 election campaign in comparison with the spring of last year. These were primarily Democratic Russia and the bloc of Sociopatriotic Movements of Russia. While at the outset the Muscovites did not pay particular attention to the belonging of the candidates to one or another official or unofficial political organization, after Democratic Russia published voter rolls the situation changed. The belonging to one or another bloc began to determine voter choice. The chances of independent candidates declined significantly.

The satisfaction of the Muscovites with the election results of the people's deputies was substantially lower than in the spring of 1989. Around 45 percent of those questioned stated that they were rather satisfied and almost the same number, some 40 percent, said that they were rather dissatisfied with the voting results. What was the reason for this? In our view, there were several of them. In the first place, the overall dissatisfaction with the organization of the election campaign and this dissatisfaction to one degree or another was expressed by a predominant majority of our respondents and was also partially transferred to the voting results. Secondly, the polarizing of the political forces naturally led to a polarizing of evaluations with some candidates being victors and others not. Thirdly, while in 1989, the very opportunity of a real choice caused satisfaction, now this was not enough. Demands also increased on both the candidates and the election system. Finally, and fourthly, there was also a general strengthening of critical attitudes in society. For this reason, the assessment of the voting results seems natural to us and not so low.

In one way or another the current political structure in society is transitional, unformed and rapidly changing. The processes in mass conscience correspond to such a situation. In concluding an analysis of the political situation based on the results of studying the public opinion of Muscovites over the last 18 months, we would like to point out the basic aspects of these processes.

The activating of public conscience is continuing. In recent months, this has assumed a qualitatively different character. While initially one observed basically a rise in the activeness of the various strata and groups in the public and the involvement of people in politics, at present there is not merely the politicizing of conscience but also the mass defining of one's positions and the polarizing of political views.

The present period in the development of society is also characterized by a radicalizing of the attitudes of people. At present, public opinion, as a rule, is ahead of those reforms which the authorities are carrying out. A majority of the Muscovites questioned by us expressed a demand for radical changes in all the life of the nation. This trend partially determines political sympathies, too.

The contradictions between the expectations of the public and their realization intensify the critical mood. People no longer want to accept many fewer shortcomings in comparison with those they tolerated previously. A manifestation of this is, for example, the loss of trust in a majority of the official and unofficial political institutions.

One other trend in the mass conscience at present is its growing mysticalness and the appearance of this we are encountering everywhere. This involves both a belief in miracles, flying saucers, the growing influence of various prophets, including psychotherapists, and much else.

Finally, and most importantly, one observes a democratizing of social conscience and this slowly is accepting democratic principles and models of political behavior. This is manifested primarily in a definite change in the attitude toward a pluralism of opinions, a multiparty system, the rights of the majority and opposition and informal structures. At the same time, for now this process is just beginning. The transition from the old totalitarian thinking will be rather complex and painful. In mass conscience we are still clearly recording views of rigid control and regulation of social life, intolerance of other opinions and leveling attitudes.

An important aspect which characterizes the state of social conscience is its particular emotional background. In the current political situation, political moods and emotions play a very marked role. If we turn again to the previous election campaign, we cannot help but point out that precisely emotions often determined voter attitudes to a candidate and correspondingly influenced the voting results. Public moods are currently very mobile and unstable and the clearest indications characterizing the emotional state of mass conscience are the appearance of anxiety and hope as well as abrupt shifts from one to the

other. These are the basic traits of mass conscience established as a result of a systematic study of public opinion among the Moscow inhabitants in 1988-1990.

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Problems of Data Interpretation of International Comparative Research

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[Article by Lyudmila Andreyevna Semenova, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior science associate at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Our journal has published her article "On Methodological Principles of Researching Social Conflict in American Sociology" (No 2, 1975)]

[Text] Carrying out comparative sociological research (both interregional or interval within one country as well as international) poses a number of problems. One of the most important is the comparability of the obtained data. As has already been pointed out [1-5], this is achieved primarily by the identicalness of the samplings, the methods of collecting the data and the methods of processing them. Thus, in organizing and carrying out any type of comparative research it is essential from the outset to ensure comparability of the obtained results using objective indicators: sex, age, education, social status and income level. The problems of this level are resolved in the stage of preparing for and carrying out the sociological research (including the "repair of the sample" and, if need be, the "reweighing" of the data).

The second group of problems is related to the analysis and interpretation of the results. Here the problem arises acutely of comparability in terms of subjective indicators. By the latter we understand data of an evaluation sort concerning satisfaction with one or another aspect of life (work, family, material status, activities of various organizations and so forth), and opinions on a whole range of problems, including the assessments of diverse social processes.

Unfortunately, in a large portion of the publications the sociological data still are of a descriptive nature with individual elements of analysis. Moreover, when the results of one research study are not compared with others, at first glance, the picture is clear, uniform and does not cause difficulties in interpretation. However, an analysis of the same data in comparison with other data obtained by an analogous method but in a different region or nation (in observing the corresponding demands of identical sampling and methods) forces one to doubt the seeming simplicity of possible interpretations and examine more profoundly the obtained results. This applies particularly to the subjective indicators. Using the example of several international comparative studies, let us endeavor to sketch in the range of problems.

Soviet and American Children: Militant or Peace-Loving?

Let us turn to a Soviet-American study (in the autumn of 1986) on the opinions of juveniles in the USSR and United States concerning nuclear weapons, the arms race, Soviet-American relations and so forth [6]. Here we would like to draw reader attention not only to the content of the replies but also to the nature of their distribution. Clearly, the idea of parity between the USSR and United States for nuclear weapons has greater support among Soviet schoolchildren (60 percent) than among Americans (42 percent) (Table 1).

Table 1: Degree of Agreement With Statement "USSR and United States should have the same nuclear might," %

Country	Disagree	Rather Disagree Than Agree	Hard to Say	Rather Agree Than Disagree	Agree
U.S.A.	25	10	23	14	28
USSR	13.5	4	23	8	52

A somewhat different picture emerges when it is a question not of nuclear might but rather military might generally. The degree of agreement was being studied for the statement "the USSR does not need to have greater military might than the United States" and this was the wording for the Soviet questionnaire; for the American it was "the United States should not have greater military force than the USSR." In both countries, those polled preferred nuclear parity. Consequently, it can be assumed that they would not insist on the necessity of military superiority of their state. But our hypothesis was not confirmed for more than 1/2 of the children in the USSR and United States did not agree with the stated opinion and actually sought military superiority of their country (Table 2).

Table 2: Degree of Agreement With the Statement "The USSR (U.S.A.) does not need to have greater military strength than the United States (USSR)," %

Country	Disagree	Rather Disagree Than Agree	Hard to Say	Rather Agree Than Disagree	Agree
U.S.A.	41	18	16	13	12
USSR	50	13	23	4	10

While the Soviet children favored nuclear parity more often than did the American, on the question of military superiority generally they were more "militant." For example, among them 14 percent agreed that the Soviet Union should not surpass the United States in military terms. Among the Americans almost double the number (25 percent) felt that their nation did not need superiority.

Finally, of interest for comparison are the replies to the question which is logically related with the previous ones in terms of the problem raised and where it is an issue

not of the balance of military forces of the USSR and U.S.A., but rather the balance of military potential of their country with the military potential of any other. The question for the Soviet juveniles was "the USSR should have significantly greater military force than any other country"; for the Americans "the United States should have significantly greater military force than any other country." We would point out that the number of completely agreed with the stated theses was virtually the same in both countries, but with this the comparisons ended (Table 3).

Table 3: Degree of Agreement With Statement "The USSR (U.S.A.) Should Have Significantly Greater Military Strength Than Any Other Country," %

Country	Disagree	Rather Disagree Than Agree	Hard to Say	Rather Agree Than Disagree	Agree
U.S.A.	21	16	21.5	20	22
USSR	32	7	32	6	23

It is possible to speak of the greater "militancy" of the American children since 42 percent of them to one degree or another share the opinion of the need for U.S. military superiority. The Soviet schoolchildren (29 percent) more rarely insisted on such a status for their country; in their majority they completely did not share the idea of military superiority (32 percent against 21 percent for the Americans).

What can be said about this? First of all, the obtained replies are important not so much from the viewpoint of the agreement or disagreement of the respondents with the proposed subjects as they are as indicators of certain social characteristics, in our instance the "militancy—peacefulness" of the children. It is also apparent that the listed subjects due to their thematic closeness should be viewed not individually but as a complex, complementing one another. However, we have reached the conclusion that the answers to questions which are similar in content do not "rank themselves" in a logical chain and it is possible to draw conclusions on the "peacefulness" of "militancy" of the schoolchildren only very hypothetically due to the contradictoriness of the judgments. In the given case it would be wise to construct a complex indicator or, for example, an index of "peacefulness" which would take into account the contradictions. Finally, precisely the comparative nature of the research made it possible to detect the contradictions and caution against hurried conclusions.

An analysis of the results makes it possible to draw a series of assumptions relative to the recorded differences. Possibly the children reason that since we will be equal in terms of nuclear weapons, then my country should be stronger in military terms. We do not know what the juveniles conceive of in the concepts of "nuclear weapons," "nuclear might," "military strength," "military might." Possibly for the children these are two different realities and they behave differently.

Sociologist and Respondent: Problems and Mutual Understanding

Here we have approached an important problem of the understanding of the questionnaire language by the respondents as well as the mutual understanding between researcher and respondent [5]. In our case this is actualized by the fact that, in the first place, it is a question of an international project and, consequently, persons are being questioned who have been raised in different social systems and have grown up in different sociocultural environments. Secondly, it is a question of juvenile schoolchildren with little social experience, a low educational level, little information and competence and this makes them more exposed to the influence of ideological stereotypes. Thirdly, in addition to those already mentioned in the questionnaire they could encounter concepts which could cause difficulties: probability, overpopulation, nuclear and biological destruction of mankind, victim of crime, asylum and so forth. The problem of the incomplete understanding by respondents of such seemingly simple and generally used words is not farfetched. As a procedural experiment conducted by L.A. Koklyagina showed, in a majority of the secondary school graduates questioned in Kurgan Oblast (N=1,870 persons), the following words and phrases caused the greatest semantic difficulties: microcalculator, vocational consultation, sex, prestige, humanitarian, morality, technology, communication, subjects of art, natural sciences and artistic abilities [ibid., pp 62-77].

An analysis of the results of a procedural sociological experiment leads to important conclusions on the comprehension of the questionnaire language by the respondents and this must be taken into account in organizing the research. First of all, this concerns the interpretation of the answers to the questions formulated with the use of foreign-origin words which on the level of ordinary awareness have assumed a judgment sense with a negative cast. The second conclusion raises the aspect of the knowledge of a word and its recognition in the text. Often a respondent, in knowing the meaning of words and phrases found in ordinary speech, does not understand them in an unfamiliar context. Finally, the presently observed process of the enrichment of daily language with certain terms borrowed from sociology (as a consequence of the development of this science accompanied by the corresponding publications in the press, and by the presentation of poll results over radio and television) as well as the use of ordinary speech by sociology are fraught with the problem that the researcher and the respondent can invest a completely different meaning in the same term.

Recently, in the periodical press and on the pages of special publications, more and more frequently they have discussed the impoverishment of the Russian lan-

guage and the transformation of it into a means of utilitarian communication. As N. Velekhova has written, "language over the years of Stalinism lost as much as man lost" [7], for several generations of Soviet people were deprived of an opportunity to become acquainted with the "refined literature" of the Russian writers and poets from the beginning of the century as well as those who had emigrated from the Soviet Union or were declared to be "enemies of the people." Russian philosophical literature at the turn of the century and the beginning of the 20th Century as well as all religious literature were declared to be an "idealistic vestige." The repressions of the Stalinist times drove compassion and the nuance of feeling and experience out of life and the concepts designating these also disappeared from the vocabulary of the Russian language due to irrelevance. One of the consequences of the impoverishment of the language has been a drop in the level of its mastery and as a result modern youth not only abuses itself in foul language but also converses in it [ibid.].

The problem of the mutual understanding of the researcher and respondent is also pertinent to any sociological poll, particularly when it is necessary to translate the question sheets into a different language, for a number of difficulties arises in the translation. As a whole, "...in order that the respondents correctly understand the questions and the sociologist there replies, a knowledge of the researcher's ideas relative to the cognitive and expressive (semantic) abilities of the persons being questioned is crucial" [5, p 115].

The Normative Setting of Answers

A respondent naturally passes the questions "through himself," that is, he correlates them to his own experience, knowledge and standards which at times are unconscious and which he is guided by in life. The ideal (in the sense of nonmaterial) normative models which exist in the awareness of an individual are constructed primarily under the influence of the sociocultural features of the micro- and macrosphere of his environment. Consideration of this given area is extremely important in an analysis and interpretation of international research, when one is comparing answers from the representatives of completely different socioeconomic systems, cultures and ways of life. Without a knowledge and consideration of the realities of daily life, an adequate interpretation and explanation are impossible.

A normative consideration, as an awareness of what is due, to a significant degree was apparent, in our view, in the answers of Soviet children to the questions of the already-mentioned Soviet-American research and, in particular, in the fact that many answers were "skewed" along the scale toward the extreme ends (agree—disagree; of course yes, of course no, and so forth), while

the answers of the American juveniles were distributed more or less evenly. This was particularly apparent in a five-point scale.

The phenomenon of a normative sense of duty was also apparent in the answers of Soviet schoolchildren to the

question of their concern over various problems (as a total 19 were given in the questionnaire) [6, p 42]. Table 4 shows the distribution of respondent opinions only for four problems, however the stated trend—greater concern among the Soviet children—was shown for all mentioned in the questionnaire.

Table 4: Distribution of Answers to Question "How much are you concerned by the following problems?" %

Problems	Not at All		Little		Rather		Very	
	U.S.A.	USSR	U.S.A.	USSR	U.S.A.	USSR	U.S.A.	USSR
Natural disasters, including earthquakes	56	34	24	16	9	15	11	35
Divorce of parents	55	25	16	8	12	10	17	57
Poor grades	16	6	22	16	25	24	38	53
Possibility of drug addiction	59	39	11	4	7	8	22	49

From the discovered "superanxiety" of the Soviet juveniles, one could scarcely draw meaningful conclusions, for example, about the degree of urgency of various problems for our society (just take natural disasters and the poll was conducted in Rostov and Tambov Oblasts in 1986, that is, before the earthquake in Armenia. The children who fell into the sampling more often had not encountered natural disasters, let alone earthquakes, and they had a poor understanding of what this was and how significant it was). The value of such information lies in the proof of the existence of "abstract generally significant priorities and opinions" (along with the individual pragmatic [8, p 175]) and which can play a dominant role in the wording of the replies, distorting an objective picture of the opinions. In the given instance, the stereotype plays such a role to a significant degree in the replies of the Soviet schoolchildren as anxiety over negative phenomena is a socially approved standard.

As a whole, in our view, the level of normative awareness is largely determined by the type of thinking prevalent in society. As is known, psychologists have established two cognitive styles. The first is open, creative, flexible and divergent thinking and the second is closed, rigid, dogmatic and authoritarian. In characterizing the rigid type of thinking, I.S. Kon has pointed out that it combines in itself a deferential-noncritical attitude toward power and having once been assimilated from an authoritative source of information shows extreme impatience and hostility to anything which contradicts the customary scheme [9, pp 69-70]. Naturally, such a cognitive style, and it precisely has been dominant, at present is far from disappeared in our society (the so-called "new thinking" is an attempt to break out of the clutches of dogmatism and authoritarianism) which does not permit a pluralism of opinions gives rise to a correspondingly rigid type of normative level in an individual who argues from the principle "if one is good then two is bad." In the language of a sociological questionnaire this means that it is either "agree" or "disagree" or "yes" or "no" and no intermediate shading and this is what we discovered in the answers of Soviet juveniles. A "unidimensionality"

of their conscience was noted at one time by the American psychologist Uri Bronfenbrenner who in the 1960s studied 6th graders from schools and boarding schools in four countries. "The Soviet children, in contrast to the Western," he wrote, "much more rarely encounter both in the family and outside it opposite viewpoints on diverse problems. As a consequence of this they develop a habit for a uniform reaction to one or another conflict situation" [10, p 56].

The complex structure of a normative view is also present in the phenomenon of a "bifurcation of the stereotype" [8, p 176]. The conscience is fixed on various points of reference—individual-pragmatic and normative-generally significant; an individual can judge the same phenomenon (including answering the questions of a sociologist) in spurning either of these [points of reference]. Consequently, in having a positive view of a certain value, he nevertheless will come out negatively, proceeding from the proper, the normatively approved and not from his own opinion. This syndrome is even more developed in international research when a respondent endeavors to answer so that he and his country appear "as good as possible."

One other aspect is related to the hierarchical structure of the norms themselves, since there are common human, state, regional, group, individual and other norms which form notions of "what is good and what is bad." For this reason, the evaluation, subjective judgments by the respondents on various social processes and phenomena must be correlated against the objective characteristics of the studied subject area. Let us refer to opinions concerning satisfaction with the work of the public health bodies in the USSR and in France as obtained in joint Soviet-French research.¹ Some 78 percent of the French (67 percent of the Parisians) were satisfied; 23 percent of the Muscovites and 33 percent of the inhabitants of the town of Inzhavino. The given figures scarcely prove a higher quality of public health in the rayon center of Inzhavino in comparison with Moscow. Rather in the views of the Muscovites and the residents of Inzhavino there are different points of reference and standards. It is quite probable that what

would satisfy the residents of Inzhavino would not satisfy the Muscovites (let alone the French). For this reason, for an adequate interpretation of the results of studying various aspects of the way of life, it is essential to have a careful correlation of the quantitative characteristics (objective indicators) with the qualitative characteristics of the conditions and forms of life of the individual (community) and with his perception of the realities of social life.

In international research one can also clearly see the existence of common human standards and above all an awareness of the global dangers threatening civilization: war, nuclear accidents, the disastrous state of the environment and drugs. The latter in the near future represents a danger for their countries. This is the opinion of 81 percent of the French, 76 percent of the Muscovites and 84 percent of the residents of Inzhavino. To an equal degree there was a recognized danger of accidents at nuclear power plants. Some 69 percent of the French, 69 percent of the Muscovites and 70 percent of the residents of Inzhavino—a surprising unanimity—pointed to the possibility of a repetition of Chernobyl-type tragedies. The respondents also unanimously recognized that a nuclear conflict could lead to the death of European civilization and this opinion was shared by 85 percent of the French (90 percent of the Parisians), 95 percent of the Muscovites and 89 percent of the inhabitants of Inzhavino; that any major war in Europe, even a nonnuclear war, could reduce it to ruins (70 percent of the French, 88 percent of the Muscovites and 82 percent of the inhabitants of Inzhavino).

However, the persons questioned in the two countries diverged in their views of the guarantees for the preservation of peace on the European continent. Here decisive were not common human standards and values but rather normative ideas of an ideological stripe to a significant degree shaped by the propaganda and defined by the particular features of the sociopolitical systems in the USSR and France. In the opinion of 1/2 of the French (among supporters of the rightist Le Pen National Front the figure was 68 percent), such a guarantee, in accord with the political doctrine of nuclear deterrence, is the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe. Among the Muscovites, a similar opinion was supported by 9 percent and by 11 percent among the Inzhavino residents. Along with the idea that "nuclear weapons are the guarantee for peace in Europe" 52 percent of the French shared the judgment of the build-up and modernization of French nuclear forces as a factor in the strengthening of peace on the continent (30 percent were against). The Soviet respondents categorically did not agree with this notion (90 percent of the Muscovites and 75 percent of the Inzhavino residents).

As a whole, a majority of the Soviet respondents (91 percent of the Muscovites and 74 percent of the Inzhavino residents) felt that there was no European problem which could not be resolved peacefully. In the French sample, this opinion was shared by 1/2 of those

questioned and one out of three did not share it. In addition, 72 percent of the French assumed that the USSR was threatening France with Soviet nuclear weapons (among the Muscovites 17 percent support this viewpoint and 11 percent among the residents of Inzhavino) while only 27 percent of them were confident that the Soviet Union would never use nuclear weapons first (Muscovites 95 percent and Inzhavino residents 90 percent). One out of three French agreed with the possibility of a Soviet first strike while 40 percent found it difficult to answer.

The given data show the contradictoriness of the judgments of the French over the problems of European security (with an observable "shift" of replies by the Soviet respondents toward the extreme ends of the scale). On the other hand, a larger portion of the inhabitants of France than the USSR understands the lethality of the arms race for the European continent. On the other hand, 1/2 of the questioned French, in accord with the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and nuclear containment, views the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe as a condition for maintaining peace on the European continent.

Image and Stereotype of Perception

The new political thinking and the study of public opinion in various countries have caused one to speak about the destruction of the "image of the enemy" and get free of stereotypes. Here the notion of a "stereotype" is employed, as a rule, in a negative sense. In our view, there must be a more careful analysis of just what are the stereotypes of perception which are meant when relations are analyzed from the viewpoint of "we—they."

In the study of social stereotypes, frequently the social and psychological aspects of the phenomenon are confused and as a consequence of this uniformly negative views arise. We proceed from the understanding of stereotypization as a real psychological process of perception the result of which is a "oversimplified, schematized, emotionally tinted and extremely persistent image of a certain social group or community and this is easily extended to all its representatives" [11, p 95].

It is essential to distinguish stereotypization as a psychological process and stereotypization as a social phenomenon. In the former instance this is a process of social perception, one of the mechanisms of social cognition and it does not carry either a positive or negative value load for it performs a cognitive function of simplification and schematization. It is a different matter when it is a question of a stereotype as a social phenomenon, that is, as content. "...It would be a major confusion to see the determinant of the content aspect of stereotypes in

psychological and sociopsychological processes of stereotypization.... The determinants of the content aspect of the stereotypes are to be found in factors of a social and not a psychological order" [12, p 183]. And here it is already valid to assess social stereotypes as positive or negative, true or false, since the judgments characterize their content from the viewpoint of corresponding to objective reality.

At the same time, it is essential to point to the psychological phenomenon which is present in the process of stereotypization and which cannot help but be considered in studying the problems of the "we—they" perception. Its essence is that on any level of intergroup interaction there is a tendency to maximize the perceived difference between the groups and minimize the difference between members of one and the same group. Precisely this and not hostility or prejudice is the distinguishing feature of stereotypization [ibid., p 184].² Such a mechanism eases the manipulating of the views of members of groups coming into contact including also the creation of an "image of the enemy." In this context the question logically arises of the measure of truth and falsehood in social stereotypes as any content can be invested in their psychological "framework." Researchers have noted the insufficient elaboration of the problem. At the same time, the most widespread is the following viewpoint: regardless of the fact that social stereotypes simplify and schematicize and sometimes distort reality, they always reflect something objective, being its more or less adequate image. "...The very reality studied by the sociologist is to a certain degree a result of the subjectivizing and objectivizing in social standards and stereotypes," whereby "the standards and role models are 'incorporated' in the stereotypes but now as that component which reflects the "proper" and "necessary" as well as the other institutional and societal characteristics" [8, pp 167, 168].

In our view, a good example of stereotypization in thinking by Soviet respondents would be the assessment of the importance of the unemployment problem for Finland.³ The correct answer to the question of the number of unemployed there was given by 10.5 percent, while the remainder either openly wrote "I do not know" (58 percent) or answered incorrectly. Obviously, the level of information of the Soviet people in the given instance is low. At the same time, 1/2 of the respondents felt that the unemployment problem (during the period of the poll its level was around 5 percent) was urgent for Finland. Here one could see the stereotype of the perception of a Western nation, since unemployment, to judge from the Soviet mass information media, is an inseparable trait of capitalism. The given stereotype can be viewed as true, for its content corresponds to objective reality. The problem of unemployment, according to the evidence of Finnish sociologists, was actually pressing at the moment of the poll.

International comparative research which has been carried out recently on the level of studying public opinion provides information how "their" notions are changing

about us and our notions about "them" under the influence of the changes occurring in the Soviet Union and including due to the development of glasnost and democratization. The activities of the Soviet mass information and propaganda media have changed greatly and to a significant degree they formed definite "images" of nations and peoples. But we must not count on a rapid reorientation of public opinion from an "image of the enemy" to an "image of the partner."

As is known, public opinion has a complex structure. For us it is important to consider the presence of "two basic 'strata' of its functioning: the superficial, which is maximally actualized and coinciding with the so-called operative (operational) conscience of the mass in a reaction of the public, the community to variable, nonrepetitive problems, events and facts of life; deep-seated coinciding with a more or less stable set of fundamental characteristics ('symbols of faith' and mechanisms) of mass conscience and inherent to a society at a certain stage of its development" [14, p 52].

Mobility of public opinion to a significant degree is characteristic of the former. Let us illustrate this by the dynamics of the opinions of Muscovites on the threat to the Soviet Union from the United States. In November 1987, on the eve of the meeting of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev, with President R. Reagan, 80 percent of the Muscovites replied "yes" to this question and 5 percent "no." However, in May of the following year, after the summit meeting in Washington and the signing of the treaty to eliminate medium- and shorter-range missiles and on the eve of the summit meeting in Moscow, just 52 percent of the Muscovites (that is, almost 30 percent less) felt that the United States was threatening the Soviet Union and 29 percent replied "no." The situational reference of public opinion was also manifested in the replies of the French to the question of what nation is the number-one "enemy of France." One out of two (54 percent) named Iran and this was actually determined not by a general negative view of this country but rather by the heightening of Franco-Iranian relations during the period of the poll and which ended with a diplomatic rupture. Here also a certain role was played by the "French Irangate" involving the delivery of weapons to Iran.

As for the stereotypes of perception which we mentioned above, these can be considered in the second, deep-seated stratum as they are less subject to situational changes, and are more persistent due to the fact that the determination of the stereotype's content is rather complex and includes factors of a varying order including psychological, cultural, national, political, ideological and historical. For this reason "to destroy a stereotype" (although, in our view, it would be more accurate to speak about "getting free of false stereotypes") and to see a partner in a former enemy—for carrying out this task time would be needed as well as substantial changes in the social processes, particularly in the political and ideological sphere and which would add content to the stereotypes. For example, it took the Finns rather a long time, some 60 years between the two wars and the concluding of the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration

and Mutual Aid in 1948 in order to completely get rid of the image of the USSR as the enemy and aggressor.

In studying the perception of the USSR, the researchers proceeded from an elucidation of the attitude of the

Finns to: 1) socialism—communism; 2) the Russians; 3) the Soviet Union as a great power and neighbor. For this reason, the key words were "Russian," "communism" and "Soviet Union" [15, p 91].

Image of USSR existing among Finns in the 1920s:	Image of the USSR existing among Finnish youth in the 1980s:
<i>Russians</i>	
—aggressive, barbarians, slavish, uncivilized	—neutral or positive attitude
—inferior race	—submissive, tolerating the system
	—with particular habits
<i>Communism</i>	
—something unnatural, senseless	—negative attitude
—atheistic	—something mythical and monstrous
—threatens vital values of Finland	—does not represent immediate threat
<i>Soviet Union</i>	
—superenemy of Finland	—strange state, incomprehensible system
—bastion of Bolshevism which threatens Western civilization and Christianity	—good neighbor
	—good trade relations
	—threat from great nuclear power

The problems posed in this article, on the one hand, do not exhaust the entire range of questions arising in an analysis of data from international comparative research and in addition many of them are of a general nature and apply to sociological research of any type, in particular, the mutual understanding of the sociologist and respondent, the balance of the normative-general significant and individual-pragmatic, the proper and real in replies and the correlation of subjective indicators with objective ones. On the other hand, the interpretation of the data, in order to avoid a distorted interpretation, requires a more complete consideration of the specific features of the studied object or process as well as a maximum number of the sociocultural, political and ideological features of the region. Without playing down the importance of studying the operational stratum of public opinion, in the international research we would like to note the following. For obtaining serious results it is essential to touch the deep-seated stratum and this is feasible only in employing a broader set of procedures and methods of analysis. Thus, the opportunity will appear to review the process of phenomenon comprehensively and from different sides, and the soundness of the conclusions and recommendations will be increased while the degree of hypotheticalness of these in the research known to us at present is very high.

Footnotes

1. Carried out under the leadership of V.G. Andreyenkov and V.A. Mansurov by co-workers of the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in November 1987 jointly with the Parisian Institute IPSOS and the TV network TF-I. The poll was conducted in France according to a national sample (N=900 persons). In the USSR, according to a representative

one: Muscovites were questioned (N=718) as well as inhabitants of the rayon center of Inzhavino in Tambov Oblast (N=184).

2. The phenomenon of so-called "intergroup discrimination" in the process of perception is sometimes detailed in the following manner: 1) maximization of intragroup similarity; 2) minimization of intragroup differences; 3) maximization of intergroup differences; 4) minimization of intergroup similarity [11, p 99].

3. Joint Soviet-Finnish research on the subject "The Image of the Neighbor Nation" conducted in November 1988. The sampling (N=1,017 persons) represented the RSFSR population [13].

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Public Health Problems Through Reader Eyes

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[Article by Valeriy Nikolayevich Zybtshev, candidate of philosophical sciences and docent at the Makeyevka Construction Engineer Institute, and Igor Zinoviyevich Dolzhan-skiy, sociologist at the Makeyevka Metallurgical Combine. This is the first time they appear in our journal]

[Text] A study of public opinion concerning the state of public health in the city of Makeyevka was carried out

with the aid of the newspaper MAKEYEVSKIY RAB-OCHIY which printed the questionnaire. Of all the documents sent in to the editors, 616 questionnaires were fit for processing.

In examining the research results, we will proceed from the particular features of a mail (newspaper) poll. With this method of collecting information, a sample is formed not randomly, as with a probability selection, and it is not representative. To put it simply, the questions of the questionnaire were answered primarily by those who had to often use the services of the public health institutions and by those least liking their services. Hence, the questionnaire results may not adequately reflect the opinion of the entire general aggregate, the city residents. However, in terms of information quality, such research approximates the expert polls and its results are sufficiently indicative since they most completely reflect the opinion concerning the shortcomings of the organization of public health in our city and they provide an opportunity to see the worst-off spheres of medicine.

Those answering the questions of the questionnaire were $\frac{2}{3}$ women, the average age of the respondents was 42.7 years and were persons with a high educational level. This actually was a portrait of an average resident of our city and the basic patient of our medicine.

As a whole, the level of medical and nursing aid was viewed by the respondents (by those who answered the questions in the questionnaire) very low: only 0.3 percent viewed it as excellent and 1.5 percent as good, while 58.0 percent felt it unsatisfactory and 36.9 percent satisfactory. There were certain differences in the assessment of the state of medical services depending upon age, education and type of employment of the respondents. With an overall low assessment of the state of public health in the city, assessing it higher than the others were respondents under the age of 20 and over the age of 60, the public health workers, housewives, students and pupils as well as respondents with a lower education level (here one can speak even about a clearly expressed trend: the higher the education level, the lower the view of the public health level in the city and vice versa).

The respondents considered the basic problems determining the level of medical services to be: the absence of the required medicines (this alarmed 68.3 percent of those polled), the poor attitude of the medical personnel to the patients (54.9 percent), the low skills of the physicians (51.9 percent), the poor organization of the reception of patients in the polyclinic (47.4 percent), poor food in the inpatient facility (44.9 percent), the lamentable state of the medical facilities (44.2 percent) and the absence of poor quality of equipment for medical research (40.1 percent).

In the opinion of the respondents, the situation in our city was worse in such sectors of medicine as therapy (40.9 percent of those replying to the questionnaire), neurology (38.3 percent), gynecology (27.8 percent), stomatology (27.1 percent) and pediatrics (22.4 percent). If

it is considered that these sectors of medical services were also accurately distributed in terms of the frequency of visits to the corresponding specialists by the city inhabitants, then it becomes clear that the level of all our medicine is uniformly low.

At present, in the mass information media voices are evermore frequently heard against the existing system of assigning the city residents to medical facilities and specific physicians. This system is viewed as inefficient and requiring reorganization. Our respondents held the same opinion. Only 10.9 percent of those polled felt that the system should remain as before, the remainder felt that it should be changed. Some 59.3 percent of those polled imagined it in such a manner that any city resident could himself choose his doctor at any medical facility, 23.7 percent felt that a person should be assigned only to a medical facility and within it choose the physician himself. A desire to obtain greatest freedom in the choice of a physician was noted more often among women, among respondents from 20 to 40 years of age and among persons with a higher education level. Respondents under the age of 20, workers and pensioners more often than the rest favored the former system of medical services.

The city is also debating paid and unpaid medical services. On this issue the opinions of the respondents split: 9.4 percent favored having all medical services be basically paid for with corresponding compensation in wages, pensions and scholarships; 28.7 percent felt that only certain narrow areas of medicine should be paid for (named more often than others were gynecology, drug treatment, sexology, venereology, neurology and prostheses); 18.5 percent agreed that only consultations by leading specialists should be paid for; all the same, a majority (39.0 percent) felt that public health should basically be free. The results are completely explainable. Above it was already said that the persons answering the questionnaire were mainly persons who sought medical aid more frequently than others and for this reason, it seems to them that they, with other conditions being equal, would suffer more materially with the introduction of payment for treatment. The most significant share of those seeking to keep gratis public health were medical workers (50 percent of the replying medical workers). A major share of such respondents was also found among the employees of the state institutions, the ideological apparatus, culture, education and science as they are now receiving relatively better medical services as well as among pensioners and students who fear that they will not be able to pay for treatment with their meager income. The smallest share of persons exclusively favoring free treatment was among the workers.

The shortcomings which exist in the organization of medical services have led to a situation where many people, particularly those who often fall ill or are severely ill, are turning for aid to the representatives of nontraditional medicine. Among our respondents 44.8 percent were such. And there are most such persons in the age group from 20 to 40 years, among persons having a higher education level and among employees in the

sphere of services, culture, education, science and public health. Fewest of all are among the pensioners.

The basic reason for turning for help to nontraditional methods is ineffective treatment in a hospital (77.6 percent of those replying) and among other reasons we would put "mistrust of medical institutions" (19.1 percent of the respondents) and the impossibility of maintaining anonymity in seeking services (4.0 percent). Most often persons turn to nontraditional medicine due to illnesses of the nervous system with 22.0 percent of those replying, for injuries, fractures and contusions with 19.5 percent, external wounds, ulcers, boils, tumors and so forth with 19.5 percent, illnesses of the stomach, liver, kidneys, the pancreas and so forth with 16.3 percent. But the largest amount of visits was for illnesses of children and 39.4 percent of those answering this question resorted to aid of nontraditional medicine on these questions; this was 18.0 percent of all persons polled. There have also been attempts to use nontraditional medicine to treat malignant tumors, sexual lability, to cause abortions and so forth. All these data indicate what sectors are less developed in our city. Here the number of persons turning for aid to nontraditional medicine will rather grow, since an absolute majority (83.0 percent) felt a positive effect from the nontraditional treatment.

The respondents gave a low assessment to the quality of preventive examinations (60.9 percent viewed this on a five-point scale as unsatisfactory). Among the basic reasons for the low evaluation: the formality of the measure which did not provide a person with anything (66.9 percent of those polled), poor organization due to which a great deal of time was spent (27.6 percent); the low level of the specialists conducting the examination (21.6 percent). Outpatient registry has also caused complaints and criticism among 69.8 percent of the respondents registered at outpatient clinics. They feel that their treatment did not differ from the treatment of the remaining patients and that they try to get rid of them more quickly and take them off registration.

More than 1/2 of those questioned (53.9 percent) mentioned cases when they were not given a sick leave certificate although they were ill. The basic reason was the absence of an elevated temperature in going to the doctor (50.9 percent of those answering this question), as well as an incorrectly given diagnosis, bureaucracy in drawing up and issuing the sick leave certificate, extortion and bribery (1.2 percent of those answering). Simultaneously with this, 63.0 percent of those questioned knew of instances when a perfectly healthy person was given a sick leave certificate. The respondents felt that the basic way of obtaining a certificate in this instance was bribery (93.8 percent named such cases) or with the aid of friends and relatives (19.3 percent).

The proposals of those polled to improve medical services were basically linked to strengthening the physical plant of the medical facilities and improving the management of medicine and the wage system for the medical workers.

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[Text] The Rise of Capitalism and European Civilization:
Sociogenetic Interpretations (A.I. Fursov) (pp 26-42)

The Bitter Truth of "Vekhi" (The Tragic Experience of
Self-Knowledge of the Russian Intelligentsia) (Yu.N.
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Measuring the Audience of Satellite and Cable TV in
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of Renewal: Society and Man] Edited by T.I.
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